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"True threats" encompass those statements where the speaker 
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to com-
mit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group 
of individuals. The speaker need not actually intend to carry out 
the threat. 
-Justice O'Connor's opinion of the Court in Virginia v. Black1 
INTRODUCTION: WADING THROUGH MUDDIED WATERS 
SOME Supreme Court decisions clarify a murky area of the law. Others further muddy an area in need of clarification. Unfortu-
nately, the Court's decision in Virginia v. Black has proven to be 
another instance of the latter. For the first time, the Court in Black 
defined the term "true threat";2 however, in providing a definition, 
the Court created more confusion than elucidation. Instead of 
clearly articulating the contours of what constitutes a "true threat," 
the Court's definition (and opinion) spawned as many questions as 
answers.3 One critical question the Court's ambiguous language 
failed to answer is what intent, if any, the government must prove a 
speaker had in order for his communication to qualify as a "true 
threat" and, thus, unprotected speech. Put another way, what is the 
required mens rea for threatening speech to be constitutionally 
criminalized? A brief comparison of two recent (post-Black) lower 
court opinions demonstrates the uncertainty underlying this spe-
cific area of "true threats" jurisprudence. 
In United States v. Bly,4 a federal district court refused to dismiss 
an indictment against a defendant charged with, inter alia, mailing 
a threatening communication in violation of federal law.5 The court 
1 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) (internal citations omitted). 
2 See id. and accompanying text. 
3 See Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation, and 
Free Speech, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1287, 1290 (2005) ("The mark of a badly written 
opinion is that the reader has more questions about the state of the law after reading 
the opinion than before. By that measure Justice O'Connor's Black opinion is very 
badly written.") [hereinafter Gey, A Few Questions]. 
4 No. CRIM. 3:04CR00011, 2005 WL 2621996 (W.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2005). 
5 18 U.S.C. § 876 (2000) ("Whoever knowingly so deposits or causes to be delivered 
as aforesaid [in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, to be sent or 
delivered by the Postal Service or knowingly causes to be delivered by the Postal Ser-
vice according to the direction thereon], any communication with or without a name 
or designating mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any other person and containing 
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held that to meet its burden, the government did not need to "al-
lege an intent to intimidate."6 For the defendant's letter to consti-
tute a "true threat," and thus fall outside the ambit of First 
Amendment protection, the government only needed to prove that 
"'an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context 
of [the] letter would interpret it as a threat of injury. "'1 Whether 
the defendant intended for the communication to be threatening 
was immaterial. Conversely, in United States v. Magleby (decided 
only two months prior to Bly), the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit posited that true threats "must be made 'with 
the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death. "'8 
According to this court, absent the speaker's intent to threaten, the 
communication could not constitute a "true threat" and was there-
fore constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. 
Such disparate conceptions have significant consequences: a 
communication considered a "true threat" in one jurisdiction may 
be deemed protected speech in another. While this doctrinal split is 
important in its own right, perhaps more significant is that each 
court relied on the same source as justification for its approach-
the Black Court's aforementioned definition of "true threats." No-
tably, both courts in Bly and Magleby claimed their respective in-
terpretations of Black as the legal high ground.9 
A main purpose of this Note is to explain why (and how) lower 
courts, such as the two discussed above, have taken various ap-
proaches-based on their different interpretations of Black-to the 
intent standard of the "true threats" doctrine. Consequently, the 
impact of Black on the true threats jurisprudence will be explored. 
More generally, this Note will focus on the role of intent in defin-
ing "true threats." It will examine the various intent standards that 
any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of the addressee or 
of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both."). 
6 Bly, 2005 WL 2621996, at *2. 
7 Id. (quoting United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973)). 
8 420 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 360). 
'The district court in Bly, which held that the speaker does not need to have the in-
tent to threaten for his words to constitute a "true threat," stated that "Black could 
not be clearer on this point." 2005 WL 2621996, at *2. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in 
Magleby, which held that the speaker does need to have the intent to threaten for his 
words to constitute a "true threat," directly quoted and cited the definition provided 
in Black when outlining its own interpretation of "true threats." 420 F.3d at 1139. 
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have been proposed and how courts have treated them. By analyz-
ing the jurisprudence from both a pre- and post-Black perspective, 
this Note hopes to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of 
the issue of intent, and its disputed place in the "true threats" doc-
trine, than has been achieved in earlier (albeit limited) scholar-
ship.10 
Because the focus of this Note is on the issue of intent, other un-
resolved matters related to the true threats doctrine will not be dis-
cussed. For instance, the degree of immediacy11 or specificity12 re-
10 While the area of "true threats" has received relatively little attention, the most 
incisive articles examining the doctrine and its various intent standards were written 
before Black was decided. See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, 
Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. Rev. 
829, 937-1010 (providing an impressive compilation of each circuit's approach to 
"true threats"); Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value 
of Threats, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 541, 565-98 (2000) [hereinafter Gey, Nuremberg Files]; 
Jordan Strauss, Context is Everything: Towards a More Flexible Rule for Evaluating 
True Threats Under the First Amendment, 32 Sw. U. L. Rev. 231 (2003). 
Articles written after Black either give cursory treatment to the issue of intent or 
focus on other topics, such as the Court's language concerning intimidation or its 
holding on the legality of cross-burning. See, e.g., Gey, A Few Questions, supra note 
3, at 1325-56; Roger C. Hartley, Cross Burning-Hate Speech as Free Speech: A 
Comment on Virginia v. Black, 54 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1 (2004); W. Wat Hopkins, Cross 
Burning Revisited: What the Supreme Court Should Have Done in Virginia v. Black 
and Why It Didn't, 26 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 269 (2004). 
Interestingly, most of the articles written after Black are more concerned with the 
ramifications of the Ninth Circuit's 2002 en bane decision in Planned Parenthood of 
the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 
(9th Cir. 2002), than the Supreme Court's 2003 Black opinion. See, e.g., Jennifer 
Elrod, Expressive Activity, True Threats, and the First Amendment, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 
541, 544, 585-608 (2004); Matthew G.T. Martin, Comment, True Threats, Militant Ac-
tivists, and the First Amendment, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 280, 297-325 (2003); Lori Weiss, 
Note, Is the True Threats Doctrine Threatening the First Amendment? Planned Par-
enthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists Sig-
nals the Need to Remedy an Inadequate Doctrine, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1283 (2004). 
11 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1105-07 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that she "would not include the imminence or immediacy of the threatened 
action as a prerequisite to finding a true threat"); United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 
1375, 1385-86 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (discussing an immediacy requirement for the com-
munication to constitute a true threat); State v. DeLoreto, 827 A.2d 671, 682 (Conn. 
2003) (citing Black for the proposition that "[i]mminence, however, is not a require-
ment under the true threats doctrine"). 
"See, e.g., United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1492 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The use of 
ambiguous language does not preclude a statement from being a threat."); United 
States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994) ("An absence of explicitly threatening 
language does not preclude the finding of a threat .... "); United States v. Carmi-
chael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1281-84 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (discussing whether a website 
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quired for the communication to constitute a true threat will not be 
addressed. Other issues regarding the actus reus of a "true threat," 
such as defining what constitutes a truly threatening statement, 
also fall outside the scope of this Note. Similarly, the area of elec-
tronic threats, an emerging subset of the "true threats" jurispru-
dence, will be dealt with only where it raises a pertinent intent is-
sue.13 This Note is focused on one question: what is the minimum 
mens rea required for threatening speech to be constitutionally 
prohibited? 
This Note will proceed in five Parts. Part I will serve as a short 
introduction to the category of true threats and its place within 
First Amendment jurisprudence. Part II will examine the history of 
true threats and intent leading up to Virginia v. Black, highlighting 
the foundational opinion of Watts v. United States and the various 
intent approaches that became available in its wake. Part III will 
discuss the potential interpretations of the language in Black, and 
Part IV will explain how lower courts have treated the Court's 
definition of true threats in Black. Finally, Part V will address the 
normative arguments for each intent approach and suggest which 
standard the Court should adopt. 
I. PUNISHING PURE SPEECH: 
THE PROSCRIPTION OF TRUE THREATS 
Whenever pure speech is regulated, it must be done with caution 
and precision.14 As the Court correctly explained in its first true 
threats case, Watts v. United States, "a statute . . . which makes 
criminal a form of pure speech[) must be interpreted with the 
commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is a 
that lacks any explicitly threatening language constitutes a true threat); Baker, 890 F. 
Supp. at 1386, 1388-90 (analyzing the degree of specificity required for the communi-
cation to constitute a true threat). 
For an influential opinion which addresses both the issues of immediacy and speci-
ficity, see United States v. Ketner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976). Despite its relatively 
important contribution to the true threats jurisprudence more generally, the Ketner 
decision will receive scarce attention here because of its minimal discussion of intent. 
13 See, e.g., infra Section 11.E. (discussing the Ninth Circuit's 2002 Planned Parent-
hood decision). 
14 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) ('"precision of 
regulation' is demanded" in the "context of constitutionally protected activity") 
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371U.S.415, 438 (1963)). 
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threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally pro-
tected speech." 15 Nevertheless, pure speech can be punished in a 
manner consistent with the First Amendment. In Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, the Court reiterated that free speech is not abso-
lute: "[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes 
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."16 Such classes 
of speech include libel, obscenity, and fighting words-"those 
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an im-
mediate breach of the peace. "11 Although the Court in Chaplinsky 
did not refer to true threats in its list of exemplary categories, it 
later recognized threats as another exception in Watts. There, the 
Court held that, like libel and obscenity, true threats may be pun-
ished without violating the First Amendment.18 
Even though Watts does not cite Chaplinksy, the classification of 
true threats as unprotected speech is clearly congruent with the lat-
ter's rationale of regulating expression that by its "very utterance 
inflict[s] injury." 19 According to the Court in Black, "a prohibition 
on true threats 'protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence' and 
'from the disruption that fear engenders,' in addition to protecting 
people 'from the possibility that the threatened violence will oc-
cur. "'20 Instead of conveying a fact, idea, or opinion, a true threat 
causes fear, disruption, and a risk of violence.21 Its contribution to 
public debate and to the marketplace of ideas, the core values of 
15 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam). 
16 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 {1942); see also Black, 538 U.S. at 358 {"The protections af-
forded by the First Amendment, however, are not absolute, and we have long recog-
nized that the government may regulate certain categories of expression consistent 
with the Constitution.") (citing Chaplinsky). 
17 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
18 Watts, 394 U.S. at 707 {holding that a statute which punishes threatening speech is 
constitutional on its face). 
19 Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572. The Court in Watts did not explicitly treat true 
threats as a categorical exception to the First Amendment, as the Court in Chaplinsky 
had treated libel and obscenity. However, subsequent cases made clear that Watts 
stands for the proposition that true threats are a categorical exception to the First 
Amendment. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). 
20 Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (alteration in original) (quoting R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388). 
21 See United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The threat alone is 
disruptive of the recipient's sense of personal safety and well-being and is the true 
gravamen of the offense.") (quoting United States v. Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 86 (8th 
Cir.1991)). 
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the First Amendment, is de minimis. As Professor Steven Gey sug-
gests, a true threat falls "outside the scope of First Amendment 
protection because it operates more like a physical action than a 
verbal or symbolic communication of ideas or emotions. "22 In addi-
tion to the personal costs associated with fear and disruption, true 
threats are responsible for the social costs of investigating and pre-
venting potential violence.23 This is most apparent when threats are 
directed at government officials and other public figures. Like the 
other classes of punishable speech, true threats serve "no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as 
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."24 
While the reasons for proscribing true threats may be agreed 
upon, attempts at defining the scope of this First Amendment ex-
ception, and determining a proper intent standard, have proven 
more elusive. Unlike the Chaplinsky triumvirate of libel,25 obscen-
ity,26 and fighting words,21 the category of true threats suffers from 
22 Gey, Nuremberg Files, supra note 10, at 593; see also State v. DeLoreto, 827 A.2d 
671, 680 (Conn. 2003) ("It is not plausible to uphold the right to use words as projec-
tiles where no exchange of views is involved.") (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
23 Elrod, supra note 10, at 547-48 ("As proscribable acts, true threats have a number 
of detrimental impacts on society ... [including] the cost of protecting against, reduc-
in~, preventing, or eliminating the threatened violence."). 
4 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
25 Although complex (perhaps unnecessarily so), the constitutional law of libel, and 
the legal standards and tests associated with it, have been clearly defined. See gener-
ally N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defining libel law for public officials 
and introducing the "actual malice" test); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
(1974) (defining libel law for public figures); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (defining libel law for non-public figures). 
26 See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (limiting regulation of 
obscene material to works depicting or describing sexual conduct and "which, taken 
as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a 
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, ar-
tistic, political, or scientific value"); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding 
that child pornography is unprotected speech under the First Amendment). 
27 See generally Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 (holding that words which are "likely to 
provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace" 
are not protected speech); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) ("This Court 
has also held that the States are free to ban ... so-called 'fighting words,' those per-
sonally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a mat-
ter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.") (citing 
Chaplinsky ). 
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the lack of a clearly discernable definition. Part of the problem can 
be attributed to the relatively few times the Supreme Court has 
squarely addressed the issue (only twice-in Watts and in Black). 
Moreover, when the Court has confronted the meaning of true 
threats, it has done so ambiguously. As a result, especially when it 
comes to the issue of intent, the true threats jurisprudence as it cur-
rently stands does not represent, in the words of Chaplinksy, a 
"well-defined and narrowly limited class[) of speech."28 Explaining 
how that happened is where this Note now turns. 
II. DEVELOPING AN INTENT STANDARD: THE ROAD TO BLACK 
A. The First Step: Watts v. United States 
The Court first addressed the subject of true threats in Watts; 
however, it had little to offer when it came to the issue of intent. 
Robert Watts was convicted for violating a federal statute that 
prohibited "knowingly and willfully" making a threat "to take the 
life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United 
States."29 In 1966, during a political debate at a public rally, Watts 
made the following statement regarding the receipt of his draft 
classification: "I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle 
the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. "30 In a short per cu-
riam opinion, the Court held that "the statute initially requires the 
Government to prove a true 'threat. "'31 Because the Court did not 
28 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571. 
29 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705 (1969). The federal statute under which 
Watts was prosecuted, still in force today in almost identical form, was 18 U.S.C. 
§ 871(a) (1964). Because most circuit court opinions that address the issue of intent 
for true threats tend to be about threats against the President, most of the opinions 
and decisions considered in this Note are based on prosecutions under Section 871. 
However, because nearly every circuit (correctly, in the eyes of this author) applies 
the same intent standard for true threats, regardless of the alleged target, see infra 
note 75, this Note will treat cases involving threats against the President the same as, 
and interchangeably with, cases involving threats against private persons. Thus, this 
Note will specify that a case discussed involves a threat against the President only 
when such a fact seems particularly pertinent or interesting. 
30 Watts, 394 U.S. at 706. 
31 Id. at 708. This was the first time the Court had ever used the term "true threat." 
It most likely included the adjective "true" in order to distinguish threats that were 
not protected by the First Amendment from those threatening statements that were, 
such as Watts's "political hyperbole." The addition of such an adjective to distinguish 
similar concepts is common in the legal lexicon. The best example is perhaps the term 
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"believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by [Watts] 
fits within that statutory term," it reversed the conviction.32 The 
Court relied on three factors, which this Note will call the "Watts 
factors," in holding that Watts's statement was not a true threat: 
the statement (1) was made during a political debate, (2) was ex-
pressly conditional in nature, and (3) caused the listeners to laugh.33 
In addition to establishing a true threats exception, the lasting sig-
nificance of Watts, at least when applied by future courts, has been 
the relevance of these three Watts factors. 34 
The Court in Watts had precious little to say on the issue of in-
tent. In a brief discussion of the statute's use of the term "willful-
ness," the Court noted that the majority of the D.C. Circuit sub-
scribed to the view, first espoused in Ragansky v. United States, 
that the willfulness requirement was met if "the speaker voluntarily 
uttered the charged words with 'an apparent determination to 
carry them into execution."'35 Skeptical of such an interpretation, 
the Court made the following observation: "[p]erhaps this interpre-
tation is correct, although we have grave doubts about it."36 Never-
theless, because the Court found Watts's speech to fall outside the 
scope of true threats, it reasoned that it need not conclusively de-
cide the intent issue.37 It is important to point out that the Court's 
"actual notice," commonly used in property and procedure law. "Actual notice" is the 
same thing as "notice" (just as "true threats" are "threats"), but the adjective, "ac-
tual," is included to distinguish "actual notice" from "constructive notice." Similarly, 
"true" threats are distinguished from those threats which constitute protected speech. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 707-08. 
34 See Strauss, supra note 10, at 242-43; see also, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 865 
F.2d 83, 85 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying the Watts factors in affirming the defendant's 
conviction). 
35 Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08 (quoting Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643, 645 (7th 
Cir. 1918)) (emphasis omitted). 
36 Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (citing Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 686-93 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., dissenting) (rejecting the Ragansky approach and arguing that 
the government should have to prove that the defendant intended to carry out the 
threat)). 
"There are several plausible explanations (or, more appropriately, speculations) as 
to why the Court addressed the meaning of true threats and the issue of intent in such 
an imprecise manner. The Court was closely divided, with three justices dissenting 
and one justice who would have denied the petition for certiorari. Watts, 394 U.S. at 
708, 712. As noted above, the Court announced its decision in a short per curiam 
opinion. Perhaps the Court wrote per curiam because the majority could not agree on 
a rationale and, thus, could not provide a more detailed explanation for its judgment. 
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analysis throughout the opinion seems more concerned with statu-
tory construction than with constitutional interpretation. Neverthe-
less, on the issue of intent, it was first down and the Court punted. 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, until Black, usually ad-
dressed true threats tangentially and typically had nothing to say 
regarding the issue of intent.38 As one commentator put it, writing 
on the eve of Black, "[f]or the Supreme Court, threat speech 
started, and apparently ended, with Watts v. United States."39 Con-
sequently, lower courts, left with little guidance, blindly searched 
for an answer to the following question: what mens rea, if any, 
must a speaker have for his communication to constitute a true 
threat? 
Possible evidence of this is Justice Douglas's concurring opinion, in which no other 
justice joined, that focuses on the history of laws prohibiting threats against a coun-
try's leader. Id. at 709. Additionally, Watts was decided only a few years after the as-
sassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. With such a 
delicate history serving as the backdrop, perhaps the Court simply wanted to reach its 
decision as narrowly as possible without limiting the scope of the statute any more 
than necessary. Whatever the explanation for the Court's terse treatment of the issue, 
the opinion failed to provide any concrete guidance. 
38 In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), the Court dealt with 
threatening speech but in the context of incitement. Relying on its incitement doc-
trine, the Court held that a speaker who threatened violence against boycott breakers 
could not be held liable for merchant losses because his speech did not incite immi-
nent, lawless action (and thus was protected). Id. at 925-29. The Court also noted that 
the speaker's "'threats' of vilification or social ostracism ... [were] constitutionally 
protected." Id. at 926. 
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992), the Court was bound by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute at issue as prohibiting only 
fighting words (and not true threats). However, the Court did refer to the "true 
threats" exception as an example of what could constitute permissible viewpoint dis-
crimination. Id. at 388. The Court explained that Congress could "criminalize only 
those threats of violence that are directed against the President" because "the reasons 
why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment ... have special force when 
applied to the person of the President." Id. (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 707, and 18 
U.S.C. § 871 (1964)). Additionally, the R.A. V. decision was the first time the Court 
provided a specific set of reasons why true threats may be regulated. See supra note 
20 and accompanying text. But, alas, the Court did not address the issue of intent. 
Finally, in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994), the 
Court merely reiterated that threats, "however communicated, are proscribable under 
the First Amendment." 
39 Strauss, supra note 10, at 242. 
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B. Available Approaches: Objective and Subjective Standards 
and Why the Difference Matters 
Before examining how lower courts after Watts addressed the is-
sue of intent, it may be helpful to introduce the main approaches 
and explain why the differences between them are significant. The 
available standards generally fall into one of two categories: an ob-
jective test or a subjective test. An objecti'.;e test de~nes a true 
threat as a communication that a reasonable person would find 
threatening. The test typically comes in one of three forms. The 
variations are based on whether the perspective of the test is that 
of a reasonable speaker, a reasonable listener, or a "neutral" rea-
sonable person.40 
All objective tests require one general intent element-the de-
fendant must have knowingly made the statement. Therefore, the 
government must prove that the "statement was not the result of 
mistake, duress, or coercion."41 For example, "a foreigner, ignorant 
of the English language, repeating these same words without 
knowledge of their meaning, may not knowingly have made a 
threat."42 Similarly, if the speaker involuntarily made the state-
ment, it would not pass the objective test. This is the only general 
intent element required by all forms of the objective test. As will 
be discussed below, the reasonable speaker test includes an addi-
tional general intent element. 
Conversely, a subjective test requires the government to prove 
one general intent element and one specific intent element before 
the communication is considered unprotected speech. The subjec-
40 See Blakey & Murray, supra note 10, at 937-1002; Strauss, supra note 10, at 247-
56. The aforementioned Bly opinion is an example of a reasonable listener objective 
test. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text. 
41 United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087, 1091 (10th Cir. 1972) (emphasis omitted). 
42 Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1918). The court in United 
States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 558 (3d Cir. 1991), provided two examples of how 
someone could make a threat unknowingly. First, if "a non-English speaker ... unwit-
tingly reads aloud a threatening statement in English, which he does not know to be a 
threat," he would not have knowingly made a true threat. Similarly, if "a person ... 
writes a threatening letter to the President and places it in his desk with no intention 
of sending it, yet later finds that a family member has accidentally mailed the letter," 
he would not have knowingly mailed the communication. Id. Neither person would 
have made a true threat because the proscribed conduct in both circumstances was 
not done "knowingly." However, as one can see, only in rare circumstances will this 
"knowingly" requirement not be met. 
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tive test comes in two forms: the specific intent to carry out the 
threat test and the specific intent to threaten test. Like the objec-
tive tests, both subjective tests require that the defendant know-
ingly made the statement. In addition, the specific intent to carry 
out the threat version states that the government must also prove 
that the defendant actually intended to carry out the threat. The 
second type of subjective standard, the specific intent to threaten 
test, instead requires the government to show that the defendant 
also intended for the communication to be threatening (or in-
tended for the recipient to feel threatened).43 
The differences between the objective and subjective tests are 
significant in two respects. First, the defenses available to a defen-
dant depend on which test the court applies. For instance, a de-
fense that the speaker did not intend for the statement to be 
threatening would not be permitted in an objective test jurisdiction 
because it would be irrelevant. Similarly, defenses based on mental 
defect or voluntary intoxication, which are available in most juris-
dictions as a defense to specific intent crimes, would only be avail-
able when a court applies a subjective test, not an objective test. In 
United States v. Twine, the court recognized such a distinction.44 
There, the defendant was convicted of violating two federal stat-
utes which prohibited the making of threats.45 In determining 
whether the defendant's diminished capacity defense was permissi-
ble, the court explained that it must first "determine whether the 
aforementioned statutes require proof of specific intent. This in-
quiry is necessary because diminished capacity, like voluntary in-
toxication, generally is only a defense when specific intent is at is-
sue. "46 Another example is United States v. Myers, where the court 
held that a defendant who had been diagnosed with post-traumatic 
stress disorder could not raise a diminished capacity defense after 
the court applied an objective test in its true threats analysis.47 
43 The aforementioned Magleby opinion adopts the specific intent to threaten test. 
See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
44 853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1988). 
45 Id. at 677 (affirming conviction based on violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 875(c), 876 
(1982)). 
46 Id. at 679 (citing United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998-1002 (D.C. Cir. 
1972)). 
47 104 F.3d 76, 80-81 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Johnson, 14 F.3d 766, 
771 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that "evidence of diminished mental capacity" was prop-
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The second important difference arises when a court is making a 
constitutional interpretation on the issue of intent. A court's con-
stitutional determination establishes the baseline from which a leg-
islature must operate.48 Thus, if a court holds that the proper con-
stitutional test for true threats is an objective one, the 
constitutional baseline is the objective test. Consequently, the leg-
islature, when drafting a statute, can require the threat being regu-
lated to meet either the objective or subjective intent test. If the 
legislature adopts a statute that meets the constitutional baseline of 
an objective test, a defendant can be prosecuted under the statute 
if his threatening communication passes either the objective or sub-
jective standard. However, if a court adopts the subjective test as 
the constitutional baseline, any statute which does not require the 
specific intent to carry out the threat or specific intent for the 
statement to be taken as threatening (depending on which subjec-
tive test is adopted) would be unconstitutional. For instance, if a 
court adopts a subjective intent test, but its legislature passes a 
statute requiring that only the objective test be met, the statute will 
be found unconstitutional because it falls below the subjective test 
baseline. If, however, a court's interpretation is based on statutory 
construction, and is not one of constitutional proportion, then this 
issue will not arise. Under these circumstances, the legislature, not 
the court, will determine the meaning of true threats with regard to 
the respective statute. 
C. Lower Courts and the Mens Rea of Subjective Tests 
As mentioned earlier, the subjective test comes in two forms, 
both of which were almost uniformly rejected by the lower courts 
between the time of Watts and Black. The first version of the sub-
jective test requires the government to prove that the speaker, in 
addition to knowingly making the statement, had the specific intent 
to carry out the threat. The Supreme Court alluded to this test in 
Watts when it cited Judge Wright's dissenting opinion from the 
erly excluded because only a showing of general intent was required); United States v. 
Richards, 415 F. Supp. 2d 547, 551 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (applying an objective test and 
holding that a defendant's "evident ... mental health problems ... do not prevent his 
threats from being 'true threats"'). 
48 A court's constitutional determination will also influence future courts' interpreta-
tions of existing statutes. 
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D.C. Circuit's Watts decision.49 In his dissent, Judge Wright as-
serted that the government should have to prove that the defen-
dant intended to carry out the threat.50 This test was apparently 
based on the belief that "only when the maker of the threat has a 
subjective intention of carrying it out is there an actual danger."51 
In its Watts opinion, the Supreme Court seemed to agree with 
Judge Wright (or, at _the very least, shared his disapproval of the 
earlier Ragansky approach) when it expressed "grave doubts" 
about the contrary interpretation espoused by the D.C. Circuit ma-
jority.52 However, as noted earlier, the Court refused to conclu-
sively decide the issue. It was not long before the lower courts took 
advantage of the Court's indecisive language and discarded the no-
tion that the government must prove the defendant's intention to 
carry out the threat. 
In a case decided only four months after the Supreme Court's 
decision in Watts, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of intent in 
the same context, a threat made against the President of the 
United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871. In Roy v. United 
States, the court held that the government was not required to 
show that the defendant actually intended to carry out the threat.53 
The court persuasively argued that this subjective standard, requir-
ing the specific intent to carry out the threat, unduly interfered 
with the purposes associated with regulating true threats, namely 
eliminating the fear, disruption, and costs of investigation and pre-
vention associated with threatening speech.54 Regardless of 
whether the defendant intended to carry out the threat, the court 
posited that "an apparently serious threat may cause the mischief 
49 See supra note 36. 
50 Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 686-89 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., dissent-
in?i). 
'Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 878 n.15 {9th Cir. 1969) {characterizing Judge 
Wright's reasoning). 
52 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
53 416 F.2d at 878. 
54 Id. at 877 {If a true threat is made, "then the threat would tend to have a restric-
tive effect upon the free exercise of Presidential responsibilities, regardless of whether 
the person making the threat actually intends to assault the President."); see also id. 
at 878 ("Whether [the defendant] acted from an intention to assault the President or 
from youthful mischief, he necessarily set in motion emergency security measures that 
might have impeded the President's activities and movement and which certainly re-
sulted in additional investigatory and precautionary activities."). 
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or evil" that the statute sought to avoid.55 Based on this reasoning, 
the court adopted the reasonable speaker objective test. Like the 
Court in Watts, the circuit court in Roy was more concerned with 
proper statutory construction than constitutional interpretation. 
The other circuits quickly followed suit in dismissing this version 
of the subjective test. For instance, in United States v. Hart, the 
Tenth Circuit noted the Watts citation to Judge Wright's dissenting 
opinion but agreed with Roy and held that the government did not 
need to prove that the "defendant actually intend[ed] to carry out 
the threat."56 The only court of appeals which did not reject this 
subjective test outright was the Fourth Circuit. In United States v. 
Patillo, the court noted the language of Watts and expressly re-
jected the "Raginsky [sic] test of intention."57 Instead, the court 
held that "an essential element of guilt is a present intention either 
to injure the President, or incite others to injure him, or to restrict 
his movements. "58 The court required the government to show the 
defendant had one of these three possible intents, but also said that 
the government could meet its burden if it were to prove that the 
speaker should have "anticipate[ d] that [his statement] would be 
transmitted to law enforcement"-a form of an objective intent 
standard.59 This interpretation, which was more statutory than con-
stitutional, was seemingly limited only to threats made against the 
President in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871. For example, two years 
later, in United States v. Maisonet, the Fourth Circuit adopted an 
objective test for prosecutions under Section 876.fi) Similarly, in 
United States v. Darby, the Fourth Circuit held that "in a prosecu-
tion under [S]ection 875(c), the government need not prove intent 
(or ability) to carry out the threat."61 Although the specific intent to 
55 Id. at 877. 
56 457 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1972); see also, e.g., United States v. Vincent, 681 
F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the subjective intent to carry out the threat test 
and adopting "the rule of the Ninth Circuit, set out in Roy v. United States"); United 
States v. Compton, 428 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that it was "not necessary 
to establish an intention to carry out the threat"). 
57 438 F.2d 13, 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1971) (en bane). 
58 Id. at 16. 
5• Id. 
60 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973). 18 U.S.C. § 876 (1970) prohibited the mailing 
of a letter containing a threat to injure the addressee. 
61 37 F.3d 1059, 1064 n.3 (4th Cir. 1994). 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1988) read as follows: 
"Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication contain-
1240 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 92:1225 
carry out the threat test was repeatedly and resoundingly rejected 
by nearly every court, it remained a favorite of hopeful defendants. 
In Rogers v. United States, the Supreme Court "granted certio-
rari to resolve an apparent conflict among the Courts of Appeals 
concerning the elements of the offense proscribed by [Section] 
87l(a)."62 This conflict centered on the opposing approaches of the 
Roy and Patillo courts regarding the intent requirement of Section 
871. However, instead of resolving the mens rea question (at least 
with respect to this type of threat), the Court reversed the defen-
dant's conviction based on a procedural error committed by the 
trial court and did not address the intent issue for which it had 
granted certiorari in the first place.63 The Court held that this pro-
cedural violation was not harmless error because the judge's re-
sponse was "fraught with potential prejudice";64 notably, the viola-
tion was never raised by the defendant at any stage of the 
litigation.65 It was second down, and the Court punted once again. 
However, all was not lost when it came to the issue of intent. In a 
concurring opinion joined by Justice Douglas, Justice Marshall 
reached the merits question and provided a new approach to the 
mens rea required for threatening speech. According to Justice 
Marshall, only those "threats that the speaker intends to be inter-
preted as expressions of an intent to kill or injure" should be pro-
scribed.66 With this assertion, Justice Marshall introduced the sec-
ond version of the subjective test: the specific intent to threaten 
test. In addition to proving that the defendant knowingly made the 
statement, the government would have to show an additional spe-
cific intent element-that the defendant intended for the statement 
to be threatening. 
ing ... any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined not more than $1,000 
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 
62 422 U.S. 35, 36 (1975). 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) is the statutory provision that prohibits 
threats against the President. 
63 As Justice Marshall stated in a concurrence, "[t]he Court today seizes on [the er-
ror] to reverse the conviction, leaving unresolved the issue that we granted certiorari 
to consider." Id. at 42 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
64 Id. at 41 (majority opinion). 
65 Id. The issue became known after the Solicitor General "confessed error." Id. at 
42 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
66 Id. at 47 ("This construction requires proof that the defendant intended to make a 
threatening statement."). 
2006] "True Threats" and the Issue of Intent 1241 
Although Justice Marshall, like those before him, engaged 
mostly in statutory construction,67 he did express a special concern 
for finding an interpretation consistent with the values of the First 
Amendment. Worried that an objective test approach, like that 
adopted in Ragansky and Roy, swept too broadly, Justice Marshall 
explained that courts "should be particularly wary of adopting such 
a standard for a statute that regulates pure speech. "68 Because the 
negligence standard of such an objective test, which "charg[ es] the 
defendant with responsibility for the effect of his statements on his 
listeners," would have a chilling effect on speech, Justice Marshall 
believed an objective test "impose[ d] an unduly stringent standard 
in this sensitive area. "69 
In addition to rejecting the negligence standard of an objective 
approach, Justice Marshall also dismissed the other version of the 
subjective test (the specific intent to carry out the threat standard): 
"I would ... require proof that the speaker intended his statement 
to be taken as a threat, even if he had no intention of actually car-
rying it out. "10 This is because "threats may be costly and danger-
ous to society in a variety of ways, even when their authors have no 
intention whatever of carrying them out."11 Justice Marshall be-
lieved his particular subjective test struck the proper balance be-
tween regulating threatening speech and protecting the values em-
bodied in the First Amendment. For Justice Marshall, the specific 
intent to carry out the threat subjective standard did not offer 
enough protection against the harms of threatening speech; at the 
same time, the objective tests went too far in regulating pure 
67 Marshall based his interpretation partly on the legislative history of § 871. See id. 
at 44-46. 
68 Id. at 47. 
69 Id. at 47-48. Justice Marshall also made the following observation: 
Statements deemed threatening in nature only upon "objective" consideration 
will be deterred only if persons criticizing the President are careful to give a 
wide berth to any comment that might be construed as threatening in nature. 
And that degree of deterrence would have substantial costs in discouraging the 
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate the First Amendment is intended 
to protect. 
Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
70 Rogers, 422 U.S. at 48 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
71 Id. at 46-47. For instance, "[a] threat made with no present intention of carrying it 
out may still restrict the President's movements and require a reaction from those 
charged with protecting the President." Id. at 47. 
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speech. Although many commentators would follow Justice Mar-
shall's lead, few courts did the same.72 
Before Black, only one circuit adopted Justice Marshall's spe-
cific mens rea approach to threatening speech. In United States v. 
Twine, the Ninth Circuit held that for prosecutions under two fed-
eral threat statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 875 and 876), the government 
must show that the defendant had "an intent to threaten," a spe-
cific intent element, when he made the threatening communica-
tion.73 Like Justice Marshall, the Twine court rejected the subjec-
tive specific intent to carry out the threat test.74 However, the court 
made clear that the application of the specific intent to threaten 
test did not conflict with the circuit's earlier statements in Roy. Be-
cause "[a] threat against the President ... is qualitatively different 
from a threat against a private citizen or other public official," the 
court held that the objective test would continue to apply to prose-
cutions for threats made against the President.75 Thus, the court's 
subjective test would only apply to charges under these two federal 
statutes. Other than this limited application, no other circuit 
adopted Justice Marshall's subjective test, and most either ig-
72 See, e.g., Blakey & Murray, supra note 10, at 1065 ("Justice Marshall once ad-
vanced a compelling argument in favor of such a standard [of a subjective test for in-
tent]. We wholeheartedly agree with it."); see also infra notes 73-78 and accompany-
in¥, text. 
'853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988). 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1982) prohibited communi-
cations made in interstate or foreign commerce containing a threat to kidnap or injure 
any person. Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 876 (1982) prohibited communications deposited in 
the mail containing a threat to kidnap or injure any person. 
74 Twine, 853 F.2d at 681 n.4 ("Our holding that specific intent to threaten and to 
transmit the threat are essential elements of the crimes defined by§§ 875(c) and 876 
does not conflict or disagree with the clear pronouncement of other circuits that spe-
cific intent (or ability) to carry out the threat is not an essential element under these 
sections."). 
75 Id. at 681 (quoting Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969)) (em-
phasis omitted). The Ninth Circuit is the only court to have drawn such a distinction 
between threats made against the President and threats made against private citizens. 
Every other circuit (with the narrow and limited exception of the Fourth Circuit, see 
supra notes 57-61) has treated the intent required for a true threat to be the same re-
gardless of whether the threat was directed at the President or at some other person. 
This author agrees with the majority of circuits that have applied the same intent 
standard across the board. The required mens rea should be the same for threats 
made against private persons and threats made against the President. 
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nored76 or expressly rejected it.77 Perhaps the Seventh Circuit pro-
vided the best explanation for why the subjective test proposed by 
Justice Marshall never gained much traction: "Although we owe 
the view of a single Justice great respect, we cannot treat it as stat-
ing the governing law. Here ... the weight of authority is to the 
contrary. Therefore, ... we reaffirm ... the objective standard as 
the proper standard for [punishing threatening speech]."78 By the 
time Justice Marshall articulated his approach, most circuits had al-
ready committed themselves to an objective test. 
D. Lower Courts and the Mens Rea of Objective Tests 
Between Watts and Black, the preferred approach of the lower 
courts, by an overwhelming margin, was the objective test. As men-
tioned earlier, there are three types of objective tests: reasonable 
speaker, reasonable listener, and reasonable neutral.79 The first 
type, the reasonable speaker test, holds that a communication is a 
true threat if it was made "under such circumstances wherein a rea-
sonable person would foresee that the statement would be inter-
76 See, e.g., United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997) (applying the 
reasonable speaker test with no mention of Justice Marshall's subjective standard); 
United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that "[t]he test 
for whether a statement is a threat is an objective one," with no reference to Justice 
Marshall's subjective standard); United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 
1265 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The only intent requirement is that the defendant inten-
tionally or knowingly communicates his threat, not that he intended or was able to 
carry out his threat."); United States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964, 965 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(applying the reasonable listener test and making no mention of Justice Marshall's 
subjective standard); United States v. Vincent, 681 F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(adopting the reasonable speaker test set forth in Roy with no reference to Justice 
Marshall's subjective standard). 
77 See, e.g., United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[E]very cir-
cuit to have addressed the question, with the exception of the Ninth, has construed 
Section 875(c) as a general-intent crime.") (citing United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 
18, 21 (1st Cir. 1997)); United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 81 (5th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782-83 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Darby, 37 
F.3d 1059, 1063-66 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 149 (6th 
Cir. 1992)). Seemingly unfazed, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its approach a decade 
later in United States v. King, 122 F.3d 808, 809 (9th Cir.1997). 
78 United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 556 (7th Cir. 1994). 
79 For a more in-depth analysis of each objective test and its respective following in 
the circuit courts before Black, see G. Robert Blakey and Brian J. Murray's impres-
sive article that thoroughly details the area. Blakey & Murray, supra note 10, at 937-
1010. 
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preted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement 
as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm."80 In 
addition to the intent element common to all objective tests (know-
ingly making the statement), the reasonable speaker test supplies 
an additional general intent requirement. Under the reasonable 
speaker test, the speaker must have acted negligently: the govern-
ment must prove that the defendant knowingly made a statement 
that he should have known was threatening. However, this is a 
much easier test for the government to satisfy than Justice Mar-
shall's specific intent to threaten test. 
Before Black, the reasonable speaker test was the most popular 
standard and was adhered to by several circuits when interpreting a 
variety of statutes. The first court to adopt it was the Ninth Circuit 
in the aforementioned Roy case.81 Interestingly, the court found 
that, although it was regulating pure speech, "[u]nlike the situation 
in Watts v. United States, there does not appear to be a free speech 
issue in this case. "82 The Sixth Circuit quickly followed suit in 
adopting the reasonable speaker test,83 and the Second,84 Third,85 
Seventh,86 and Tenth87 Circuits were not far behind. Notably, each 
of these circuits traced their reasonable speaker roots back to 
Roy.88 
80 United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Roy) (emphasis 
omitted). 
81 416 F.2d at 877-78. This approach was reaffirmed in Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 
1265. 
82 Roy, 416 F.2d at 879 n.17 (internal citations omitted). · 
83 United States v. Lincoln, 462 F.2d 1368, 1369 (6th Cir. 1972) ("We ... adopt the 
construction of the Ninth Circuit in Roy v. United States."); see also United States v. 
Vincent, 681 F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir. 1982) (affirming Lincoln and the reasonable 
speaker test). 
84 United States v. Johnson, 14 F.3d 766, 768 (2d Cir. 1994) ("It is well settled that 
[Section] 871 requires only a showing of general intent. The Ninth Circuit, in the lead-
infil case on this question, [Roy,] held that [the reasonable speaker test applies]."). 
5 Kosma, 951 F.2d at 557 (adopting the reasonable speaker test of Roy). 
86 United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1986) (adopting the reason-
able speaker test and quoting Roy); see also United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 
1186, 1192 (7th Cir. 1990) (reaffirming Hoffman). 
87 United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087, 1090-91 (10th Cir. 1972) (adopting the rea-
sonable speaker test of Roy). 
88 The importance of this fact will be discussed shortly. See infra notes 91-93 and 
accompanying text. 
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In United States v. Fulmer, the First Circuit joined its peers and 
adopted the reasonable speaker version of the objective test.89 In a 
lengthy opinion, the court explained why the reasonable speaker 
test, and not the reasonable listener test, was "the appropriate 
standard under which a defendant may be convicted for making a 
threat": 
This standard not only takes into account the factual context in 
which the statement was made, but also better avoids the perils 
that inhere in the "reasonable-recipient standard," namely that 
the jury will consider the unique sensitivity of the recipient. We 
find it particularly untenable that, were we to apply [the reason-
able listener standard], a defendant may be convicted for making 
an ambiguous statement that the recipient may find threatening 
because of events not within the knowledge of the defendant.90 
In addition to the intent element common to all objective tests, the 
Fulmer court wanted to require a showing of negligence, an ele-
ment that does not appear in the reasonable listener test. 
Interestingly, for the reasonable speaker test, what started as 
pure statutory construction morphed into a constitutional interpre-
tation of true threats. Although the Roy decision expressly stated 
that it found no First Amendment issue when advocating the rea-
sonable speaker test, future courts relied on Roy's objective test as 
a constitutional standard. For instance, in United States v. Merrill, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed its holding in Roy and dismissed the de-
fendant's constitutional claim, noting that courts "interpreting 18 
U.S.C. § 871 [as in Roy] ... have uniformly concluded that 'true' 
threats, of the type proscribed by the statute, are not constitution-
ally protected speech."91 Similarly, in United States v. Orozco-
Santillan, the court held that the reasonable person standard, as 
stated in Roy, defined the scope of "a 'true' threat" as speech that 
"is unprotected by the [F]irst [A ]mendment. "92 In perhaps the 
clearest example of this transition from pure statutory construction 
89 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997). 
90 Id. For a discussion of why courts such as the one in Fulmer adopted an objective 
test instead of a subjective test, see infra notes 206-12, 217, and accompanying text. 
91 746 F.2d 458, 462 (9th Cir. 1984). 
92 903 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1492-93 (mak-
ing the same assertions as the court in Orozco-Santillan). 
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to constitutional interpretation, the court in United States v. Hanna 
explained that "a statement is [a] true threat for the purposes of 
§ 871(a) and the First Amendment if" it meets the reasonable 
speaker test first adopted in Roy.93 Put simply, the extremely influ-
ential Roy standard, which was expressly decided without the First 
Amendment in mind, became a test of constitutional proportion. 
Until Black (and even after), it represented the majority approach 
to the meaning of true threats and its required intent. 
The reasonable listener test, the second version of the objective 
test, takes a different perspective: a communication is a true threat 
if "an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the con-
text of the [statement] would interpret it as a threat of injury."94 
Unlike the reasonable speaker test, this test serves only as a juris-
diction's definition of a true threat and does not provide an addi-
tional intent element. In reasonable listener jurisdictions, the only 
intent element is that the statement was knowingly made. Even 
though it was not as widespread as the reasonable speaker stan-
dard, this test also enjoyed a significant following. Beginning with 
the Fourth Circuit's articulation of it in United States v. Maisonet,95 
panels from the Second,% Seventh,97 Eighth,98 and Eleventh99 Cir-
cuits all adopted versions of the reasonable listener test. For in-
stance, in United States v. Malik, the Second Circuit held that the 
test for determining whether a communication is a threat "is an ob-
jective one" and directly quoted the language of Maisonet. 100 Simi-
larly, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, opined that 
93 293 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002). 
94 United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973). 
95 Id. Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit adopted a subjective test, at least partially, for 
threats made against the President, see United States v. Patillo, 438 F.2d 13, 16 (4th 
Cir. 1971), but an objective test for other forms of threatening speech. See supra notes 
57--60 and accompanying text. 
% United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994). 
97 United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990); see also United 
States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming Schneider). Seemingly con-
tradicting itself, the court in Aman also cited the reasonable speaker test as the defini-
tion of a threatening statement. Id. This exemplifies the confusion underlying the is-
sue of intent and threatening speech. 
98 United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996); see also United 
States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming Dinwiddie). 
99 United States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964, 965 (11th Cir. 1983). 
100 Malik, 16 F.3d at 49 (quoting United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th 
Cir. 1973)). 
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"(t]he test for whether a statement is a threat is an objective one; it 
is not what the defendant intended but whether the recipient could 
reasonably have regarded the defendant's statement as a threat."101 
Although it was rarely (if ever) mentioned by the courts that ad-
hered to the reasonable listener test, this version of the objective 
standard does have a link to the Court's pronouncement in Watts. 
Because one of the Watts factors was the reaction of the audience, 
it is plausible to construe the reasonable listener test as a particular 
application of this specific Watts factor. 
Unlike Roy and the reasonable speaker test, the foundational 
opinion of the reasonable listener test did consider the First 
Amendment implications of its approach. In Maisonet, the Fourth 
Circuit held the following: 
Even when the defense is based on a claim of (F]irst 
[A]mendment rights, ... (i]f there is substantial evidence that 
tends to show beyond a reasonable doubt that an ordinary, rea-
sonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the letter 
would interpret it as a threat of injury, the court should submit 
the case to the jury.102 
As time went on, the test became synonymous with the meaning of 
unprotected speech for these circuits. For example, in United States 
v. Hart, the Eighth Circuit held that "(t]o determine whether a true 
threat exists, a court must analyze the alleged threat in light of its 
entire factual context and determine whether the recipient of the 
alleged threat could reasonably conclude that it expresses a deter-
mination or intent to injure presently or in the future." 103 However, 
as noted above, the reasonable listener test did not require an addi-
tional showing of intent (negligence or otherwise) beyond the 
knowledge standard shared by all objective tests. 
The third and final objective standard is the reasonable neutral 
test. It generally asserts that "a communication is a threat ... if 'in 
its context (it] would have a reasonable tendency to create appre-
101 Schneider, 910 F.2d at 1570 ("A threat is not a state of mind in the threatener; it is 
an appearance to the victim.") (quoting United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 310 
(7th Cir. 1987)). 
102 Maisonet, 484 F.2d at 1358. 
103 212 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). 
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hension that its originator will act according to its tenor."' 104 Like 
the reasonable listener test, this standard only identifies the mean-
ing of a true threat-the actus reus-not any additional intent 
standard. Consequently, the only intent the government must 
prove is that the speaker knowingly made the statement. This ver-
sion was the least popular of the objective tests and enjoyed a de-
voted following only in the Fifth Circuit.105 
To summarize, with little guidance from the Supreme Court, the 
circuit courts fashioned four possible intent standards for true 
threats; two were based on a subjective test and two were based on 
an objective test. The first subjective test was the specific intent to 
carry out the threat test. Under this standard, the government must 
prove two intent elements: that the defendant knowingly made the 
statement and that he intended to carry out the threat. The specific 
intent to threaten standard, articulated by Justice Marshall, also 
required the government to prove two intent elements: the gov-
ernment had to show that the defendant knowingly made the 
statement and intended it to be threatening. The third intent stan-
dard was embodied by the reasonable speaker test. According to 
this approach, the government must prove two intent elements. 
Namely, the defendant must have knowingly made the statement 
and should have known of its threatening character. The final in-
tent approach was used by the reasonable listener and reasonable 
neutral standards. Here, the government only needed to prove one 
intent element-that the defendant knowingly made the statement. 
E. The Penultimate Step: Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists 
In perhaps the most important, and certainly most controversial, 
true threats case between Watts and Black, a sharply fractured 
Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, decided Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists.106 
Four physicians and two health clinics that provided abortions 
"brought suit under FACE [Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances 
104 United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States 
v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1997)) (alteration in original). 
105 See id.; see also supra notes 81-89, 95-101, and accompanying text. 
106 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en bane). 
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Act] claiming that they were targeted with threats by the American 
Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA)" and others.107 The threats that 
allegedly targeted them included "GUILTY" posters which identi-
fied several doctors (including the plaintiffs) and the infamous 
"Nuremberg Files" website.108 The trial court denied ACLA's 
summary judgment motion, and the jury returned a verdict against 
the defendants; the court then enjoined ACLA from publishing 
posters and other materials that threatened the plaintiffs.109 A 
Ninth Circuit panel reversed the conviction, citing First Amend-
ment concerns. However, the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en 
bane, disagreed with the earlier panel, and affirmed the jury's deci-
sion.110 
Although this case presents a variety of important First 
Amendment and true threats issues, only the debate over intent 
will be discussed here. As the en bane court noted at the outset, 
"the first task is to define 'threat' for purposes of the [FACE] Act. 
This requires a definition that comports with the First Amend-
ment, that is, a 'true threat.' The Supreme Court has provided 
benchmarks, but no definition. "111 After remarking on the lack of 
guidance from the Supreme Court, the majority made the follow-
ing observation: 
Thus, Watts was the only Supreme Court case that discussed 
the First Amendment in relation to true threats before we first 
confronted the issue. Apart from holding that Watts's crack 
about L.B.J. was not a true threat, the Court set out no standard 
for determining when a statement is a true threat that is unpro-
107 Id. at 1062. 
108 Id. The website was a "compilation about those whom the ACLA anticipated one 
day might be put on trial for crimes against humanity. The 'GUILTY' posters identi-
fying specific physicians were circulated in the wake of a series of 'WANTED' and 
'un WANTED' posters that had identified other doctors who performed abortions be-
fore they were murdered." Id. 
109 Id. at 1062-63 (citing Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. 
Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1995 (D. Or. 1998) (denying 
summary judgment); Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. 
Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1155-56 (D. Or. 1999) (issuing the in-
junction)). 
110 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1063. Although it affirmed the jury's verdict, the 
Ninth Circuit did "remand for consideration of whether the punitive damages award 
comports with due process." Id. 
111 Id. at 1071. 
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tected speech under the First Amendment. Shortly after Watts 
was rendered, we had to decide in Roy v. United States whether 
[the defendant) made a true threat .... We adopted a 'reason-
able speaker' test ... [and) have applied this test to threats stat-
utes that are similar to FACE. Other circuits have, too. We see 
no reason not to apply the same test to FACE.112 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit once again applied its familiar reasonable 
speaker standard, originally set forth in Roy, as the test for distin-
guishing protected from unprotected speech. 
With regard to an additional subjective intent element, the court 
expressly held that "[i]t is not necessary that the defendant intend 
to, or be able to carry out his threat; the only intent requirement 
for a true threat is that the defendant intentionally or knowingly 
communicate the threat." 113 Put simply, if the speaker knowingly 
made the statement and should have known of its threatening na-
ture, then his speech is unprotected. According to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, this general intent standard was the best approach in light of 
the purposes supporting the prohibition of true threats.114 Because 
the defendants knowingly made the statement and should have 
foreseen that it would be understood as a threat, the court held 
that the statement was not protected by the First Amendment and 
affirmed the jury's verdict. 
As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit was closely divided. The deci-
sion was 6-5, and three dissenting opinions were issued. The dis-
senting opinion of Judge Berzon, which three of the other dissent-
ing judges joined in full and the other dissenter joined in part, 
articulated a new approach to the definition of true threats. Judge 
Berzon, a relative newcomer to the court (she was appointed in 
2000), discarded the objective test traditionally adhered to by the 
112 Id. at 1074-75 (internal citations omitted). 
113 ld. at 1075 (citing, inter alia, Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 
1969)). 
114 Specifically, the court remarked: 
[The purpose of regulating threats] is not served by hinging constitutionality on 
the speaker's subjective intent or capacity to do (or not to do) harm. Rather, 
these factors go to how reasonably foreseeable it is to a speaker that the listener 
will seriously take his communication as an intent to inflict bodily harm. This 
suffices to distinguish a "true threat" from speech that is merely frightening. 
Id. at 1076. The purposes are those outlined in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
388 (1992). 
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Ninth Circuit and, most importantly for the purposes of this Note, 
proposed a subjective intent standard. 
The motive behind her suggested standard was a belief that the 
reasonable speaker test espoused by the majority was "insuffi-
ciently cognizant of underlying First Amendment values."115 Influ-
enced by First Amendment libel jurisprudence, Judge Berzon 
wanted to devise constitutional standards that vary with the con-
text of the communication, as opposed to the majority's unitary 
approach.116 Towards this end, in the context of a public protest, 
where First Amendment concerns are heightened, Judge Berzon 
would require a showing of specific intent: 
Although this court's cases on threats have not generally set any 
state of mind requirements, I would . . . [require] in the public 
protest context the additional consideration whether the defen-
dant subjectively intended the specific victims to understand the 
communication as an unequivocal threat that the speaker or his 
agents or coconspirators would physically harm them.117 
This is a version of the "specific intent to threaten" subjective test; 
she pushed for "the inclusion of a 'specific intent' requirement with 
regard to the speaker's intent to threaten."118 According to Judge 
Berzon, the negligence standard of the objective test weakens First 
Amendment protection "by holding speakers responsible for an 
impact they did not intend" and, consequently, has a chilling effect 
on speech.119 By adding a specific intent element for speech made in 
the context of public protest, a proper balance, at least in Judge 
Berzon's eyes, is reached. 
The split within the Ninth Circuit epitomized a larger division 
that existed across the lower courts over the proper intent standard 
for true threats.120 As a result, the panoply of possible intent stan-
115 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1101 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
116 Id. at 1104. 
111 Id. at 1107. 
118 Id. at 1107 n.8. 
119 Id. at 1108 ("Unsure of whether their rough and tumble protected speech would 
be interpreted by a reasonable person as a threat, speakers will silence themselves 
rather than risk liability."). 
120 See United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 718-19 (7th Cir. 1986) (Will, J., dis-
senting) ("Following Watts, the courts have developed various formulations to de-
scribe the degree of mens rea the government must prove to establish a 'true 
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<lards was causing a cacophony in the jurisprudence.121 This confu-
sion was symptomatic of the Supreme Court's refusal to adopt a 
clear definition for true threats. As Professor Gey observed at the 
time, "the lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court on this 
subject has fostered the proliferation of eclectic and contradictory 
standards."122 The pending appeal from the Planned Parenthood 
case seemed like an opportune time for the Court to clarify the ju-
risprudence, including the issue of intent. As one commentator 
openly hoped, "[w]ith luck, the Supreme Court will soon take the 
opportunity to clarify matters, perhaps even with the Planned Par-
enthood case."123 Instead, the Court denied certiorari.124 But, as 
"luck" would have it, less than two weeks after the Ninth Circuit's 
Planned Parenthood decision, the Court granted certiorari in a 
group of cross-burning cases from Virginia, providing new hope 
that the Court would settle, once and for all, the meaning of true 
threats.125 
III. THE COURT FINALLY SPEAKS: VIRGINIA V. BLACK 
In Virginia v. Black, the Court finally provided a definition of 
true threats. Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice O'Connor 
held that "'[t]rue threats' encompass those statements where the 
threat."'); see also Gey, Nuremberg Files, supra note 10, at 545 ("[T]he lower courts 
cannot even agree on which factors should be the focal point of First Amendment 
cases dealing with threats, much less on how much protection the Constitution offers 
such speech."). 
121 See, e.g., United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1994) (defining a 
"threat" using the reasonable listener standard but defining a threatening "statement" 
using the reasonable speaker test). 
122 Gey, Nuremberg Files, supra note 10, at 545; see also Strauss, supra note 10, at 
232 ("Despite numerous opportunities to update the common law rule for threat 
speech, the Supreme Court has demonstrated an unfounded refusal to act. In light of 
this, several circuit courts of appeal and at least two state supreme courts have devel-
oped their own legal rules for dealing with threat speech .... An unclear and dispa-
rate approach to threat speech risks contradictory outcomes and exposes citizens to 
potentially unfair penalties for a simple slip of the tongue."). 
123 Strauss, supra note 10, at 273. 
12
• Am. Coalition of Life Activists v. Planned Parenthood of the Colum-
bia/Willamette, Inc., 539 U.S. 958 (2003). The petition for writ of certiorari was de-
nied on June 27, 2003. 
125 Virginia v. Black, 535 U.S. 1094 (2002) (granting certiorari). The petition for writ 
of certiorari was granted on May 28, 2002; the Ninth Circuit's Planned Parenthood 
opinion was filed on May 16, 2002. 
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speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or 
group of individuals. The speaker need not actually intend to carry 
out the threat."126 She also explained that "[i]ntimidation in the 
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true 
threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of 
persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm 
or death. "121 
The Supreme Court's Black decision was based on three sepa-
rate criminal prosecutions. Each defendant was charged with, and 
later convicted of, violating Virginia's cross-burning law. The stat-
ute, Section 18.2-423 of the Virginia Code, prohibited the burning 
of a cross "with the intent of intimidating any person or group of 
persons."128 It also had a provision which stated that "[a]ny such 
burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to in-
timidate."129 The namesake of the decision, Barry Black, was con-
victed under the statute for burning a cross at a Ku Klux Klan rally 
that he led. The cross was burned on private property with. the 
owner's permission but could be seen from a public highway 
nearby. The two other defendants, Richard Elliott and Jonathan 
O'Mara, were convicted for attempting to burn a cross in the yard 
of an African American neighbor. 130 All three defendants appealed 
to the Supreme Court of Virginia, arguing that the cross-burning 
statute was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the 
cases for the purposes of appeal. 
Relying on the Supreme Court's prior decision in R.A. V. v. City 
of St. Paul, the Supreme Court of Virginia declared the Virginia 
126 Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 (internal citations omitted). 
127 Id. at 360 (emphasis added). 
128 The statute read in full: 
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating 
any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the 
property of another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall vio-
late any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. Any such 
burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a per-
son or group of persons. 
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (1996); see also Black, 538 U.S. at 348 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
129 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (1996); see also Black, 538 U.S. at 348. 
130 Black, 538 U.S. at 348, 350. 
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statute "analytically indistinguishable from the ordinance found 
unconstitutional in R.A. V." and held that it discriminated on the 
basis of content since it "selectively chooses only cross burning be-
cause of its distinctive message. ,,m In addition, the court found the 
prima facie clause overbroad.132 Consequently, the court held the 
statute facially unconstitutional. Three justices dissented from the 
majority opinion and asserted that the statute was constitutionally 
permissible because it only proscribed true threats.133 The dissent-
ers also distinguished the Virginia statute from the ordinance of 
R.A. V. and had no problem with the prima facie provision because 
the burden of proof remained on the state.134 The Commonwealth 
of Virginia petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted cer-
tiorari for the consolidated appeal. 
As can be gleaned from the briefs and oral argument, the scope 
and contours of the true threats doctrine was not the focus of the 
parties or Justices involved. 135 Instead, the viewpoint and content 
discrimination analysis of R.A. V. and the statute's prima facie pro-
vision consumed much of the ink and spoken word of the appellate 
process. Thus, it is not surprising that the Court's definition of 
"true threats" consisted of only two sentences and the definition of 
"intimidation" a single sentence. In the briefs, during oral argu-
rn Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 742, 744 (Va. 2001); see R.A.V. v. City 
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). 
132 Black, 553 S.E.2d at 738. 
133 Id. at 751 (Hassell, J., dissenting) ("Thus, applying the clear and unambiguous 
language in Code § 18.2-423 in conjunction with our established definition of intimi-
dation, which the majority ignores, I conclude that Code § 18.2-423 only proscribes 
conduct which constitutes 'true threats.' ... It is well established that true threats of 
violence can be proscribed by statute without infringing upon the First Amend-
ment."). 
134 Id. at 753-56. 
135 For instance, the term "true threats" appeared only once in the Commonwealth 
of Virginia's appellate brief. Brief of Petitioner at 26, Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 
01-1107). Similarly, it was substantively used only once in the amicus curiae brief filed 
by the United States. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18-19, Black, 
538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107). Although true threats received more attention in 
the respondent's appellate brief and the petitioner's reply brief, the true threats doc-
trine was completely overshadowed by the debate over viewpoint discrimination and 
R.A. V. See generally Brief on Merits for Respondents, Black, 583 U.S. 343 (2003) 
(No. 01-1107); Reply Brief of Petitioner, Black, 583 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107). 
Similarly, at oral argument, the focus was on R.A. V. and the essence of viewpoint dis-
crimination, not on the meaning of true threats. See generally Oral Argument Tran-
script, Black, 583 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107). 
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men ts, and in the Court's opinion, the discussion of the true threats 
doctrine served an ancillary purpose-providing the foundation 
from which the content discrimination analysis of R.A. V. could be-
gin. 
In R.A. V., the Court posited that "[w]hen the basis for the con-
tent discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire 
class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea 
or viewpoint discrimination exists. "136 In order to apply this excep-
tion to the general prohibition on content discrimination, the Court 
in Black first needed to define true threats (and intimidation); 
then, it could determine whether the present statute successfully 
proscribed only those threats which are "a particularly virulent 
form of intimidation. "137 The Court held that: 
The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burn-
ings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is 
a particularly virulent form of intimidation. Instead of prohibit-
ing all intimidating messages, Virginia may choose to regulate 
this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross burning's 
long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence.138 
Although the Court held that Virginia could constitutionally pro-
hibit cross burning done with the intent to intimidate, a plurality 
found the statute unconstitutional because of its prima facie 
clause.139 Interestingly, the Court affirmed the Virginia Supreme 
136 R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388. For instance, "the Federal Government can criminalize 
only those threats of violence that are directed against the President ... since the rea-
sons why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment ... have special force 
when applied to the person of the President." Id. 
137 Black, 538 U.S. at 363. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 364 ("The prima facie evidence provision, as interpreted by the jury instruc-
tion [in Barry Black's trial], renders the statute unconstitutional."). Justice Scalia, a 
member of the five justice majority in Parts I-III of Justice O'Connor's opinion of the 
Court, dissented from this part of the decision regarding the prima facie provision. He 
preferred remanding the judgment to the Virginia Supreme Court and allowing that 
court to construe the prima facie provision; he believed that "there is no justification 
for the plurality's apparent decision to invalidate that provision." Black, 538 U.S. at 
368 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in 
part). Three Justices who concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part-in 
an opinion written by Justice Souter-agreed that the prima facie provision was prob-
lematic, but they would have held the statute unconstitutional regardless of how the 
prima facie provision was construed. They believed the statute clearly violated R.A. V. 
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Court's dismissal of Barry Black's conviction but only vacated the 
judgments of Elliott and O'Mara and remanded their cases for fur-
ther proceedings.140 
Because the Court's focus was not on carefully defining true 
threats, but on providing a basis for its content discrimination 
analysis,141 the Court left a variety of viable interpretations in its 
wake. Most importantly, at least for the purpose of this Note, the 
Court's language failed to clearly settle the issue of intent. Al-
though the Court did hold that the specific intent to carry out the 
threat was not required for the communication to constitute a true 
threat, little else with respect to intent was conclusively resolved.142 
There are three plausible interpretations of the Court's language 
regarding the constitutionally required intent for true threats; this 
Note will articulate each in turn.143 
First, the Court could have been adopting one of the objective 
test approaches, which only require the defendant to have know-
ingly made the statement (and, for the reasonable speaker test, 
that the defendant should have known of its threatening nature). 
According to this interpretation, the phrase "means to communi-
cate" used by the Court in Black is synonymous with the "know-
ingly" intent standard, which simply requires that the "statement 
and did not meet any of its exceptions. Black, 538 U.S. at 380-82 (Souter, J., concur-
rin~ in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
1 Further proceedings included the determination of whether the prima facie clause 
was severable from the rest of the statute and whether two of the defendants, Elliott 
and O'Mara, could be retried. Black, 538 U.S. at 367-68. 
141 See also Gey, A Few Questions, supra note 3, at 1294-95 ("Having found a First 
Amendment pigeonhole into which she could shove the speech at issue in the Virginia 
statute, Justice O'Connor chose not to investigate the nature of that pigeonhole or to 
analyze whether cross burning is analogous to other forms of speech already lodged in 
the 'true threats' slot."). 
142 Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 ("The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the 
threat."). 
143 For the convenience of the reader, the Court's definitions of true threats and in-
timidation are reprinted here: 
"True threats" encompass those statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful vio-
lence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need not 
actually intend to carry out the threat. ... Intimidation in the constitutionally 
proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a 
threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in 
fear of bodily harm or death. 
Id. at 359-60 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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was not the result of mistake, duress, or coercion."144 The defini-
tion's second clause, "a serious expression of an intent to commit 
an act of unlawful violence," could be interpreted as only necessi-
tating a showing that the statement was objectively a "serious ex-
pression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence" (for 
instance, as understood by a reasonable person).145 Furthermore, as 
noted above, the Court clearly rejected one of the two subjective 
tests-the specific intent to carry out the threat standard. This has 
led at least one commentator to assert that "the Black majority in-
dicates that the relevant intent [for true threats] is merely the in-
tent to utter whatever words are found to be threatening .... Thus, 
it is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution if the speaker intended to 
say the thing that created fear in a listener," even if he did not in-
tend to create the fear.146 
Although the constitutional concept of intimidation does include 
the specific intent to threaten standard, the Court stated that in-
timidation is merely a "type of true threat."147 Thus, an objective 
test interpretation would posit that because intimidation is merely 
a type of true threat, the specific intent to threaten requirement 
does not necessarily apply to all true threats but only to all pro-
scribable intimidation speech. Moreover, the Court was certainly 
aware of this subjective test and knew how to include it as a re-
quirement (since it did so for intimidation). Consequently, if the 
Court wanted such a specific intent showing for all true threats, it 
could have easily said so. Instead, the Court provided no such re-
quirement when it came to the definition of true threats. Finally, as 
was discussed earlier, the objective test approach (in one of its 
forms) was the predominant standard in all of the federal circuit 
courts. If the Court wanted to change the landscape of the juris-
144 Black, 538 U.S. at 359; United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087, 1090-91 (10th Cir. 
1972) (emphasis omitted); see also supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
145 Black, 538 U.S. at 359. For instance, a pre-Black court that adopted an objective 
test approach used strikingly similar language when articulating its own standard: 
"[a]ll the courts to have reached the issue [of the meaning of true threats] have consis-
tently adopted an objective test that focuses on whether a reasonable person would in-
terpret the purported threat as a serious expression of an intent to cause a present or fu-
ture harm." Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(emphasis added). 
146 Gey, A Few Questions, supra note 3, at 1346. 
147 Black, 438 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added). 
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prudence so dramatically, and adopt a specific intent to threaten 
requirement, it would have done so in a more straightforward fash-
ion. It is unlikely, according to this interpretation, that the Court 
would reject every circuit court's position in two sentences of fairly 
ambiguous language. For all these reasons, the Court's definition 
could be interpreted as espousing an objective test approach.148 
Second, the Court could have been adopting the subjective "spe-
cific intent to threaten" standard for the entire category of true 
threats. This interpretation is based on a different understanding of 
the Court's use of the words "means to."149 Instead of modifying 
only "communicate," it applies to the entire phrase "communicate 
a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful vio-
lence. "150 The defendant must intend to (mean to) communicate an 
expression which is threatening. In other words, he must have the 
specific intent to place the victim in fear of bodily harm or death. 
The constitutional meaning of "intimidation" requires such a show-
ing of intent. As the Court explained, for speech to be proscribed 
as intimidating, the speaker must "direct[] a threat to a person or 
group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of 
bodily harm."151 The Court also noted that intimidation is a "type 
of true threat."152 From the perspective of the subjective test inter-
pretation, this could mean that intimidation is a type of true threat 
because it requires the specific intent to threaten. According to this 
148 Even proponents of this interpretation, however, would be hard-pressed to de-
termine the objective test, if any, for which the Court expressed a preference. 
149 The phrase "means to communicate" had only appeared in a Supreme Court re-
porter three times prior to Black. Notably, none of these instances were opinions of 
the Court. The phrase was used twice in dissenting opinions. See Metromedia v. San 
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555-56 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Relying on simplistic 
platitudes about content, subject matter, and the dearth of other means to communi-
cate, the billboard industry attempts to escape the real and growing problems ... in 
protecting safety and preserving the environment in an urban area."); Lloyd Corp. v. 
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 586 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It becomes harder and 
harder for citizens to find means to communicate with other citizens."). The third 
time the phrase appears in the reporter is during the description of defense counsel's 
oral argument. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 338 (1849). The opinion in 
Black was the only time the term "means" has referred to intent instead of capability 
or availability. Thus, prior Supreme Court usage provides no additional guidance as 
to the potential meaning of "means to communicate." 
"
0 Black, 538 U.S. at 359. 
m Id. at 360. 
1;2 Id. 
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understanding, the unifying theme of true threats, in all its forms, 
would be the specific intent to threaten. For instance, harassment 
may be considered another form of a true threat, different from in-
timidation, but similar in that the speaker must have the specific in-
tent to cause fear. 153 Furthermore, the Court clearly held that the 
other form of subjective intent, the specific intent to carry out the 
threat, was not required. If the Court wanted to make the same 
statement regarding the specific intent to threaten as it relates to 
true threats generally, it could have easily done so. Instead, the 
Court only rejected the specific intent "to carry out the threat" 
standard and included the specific intent to threaten standard for 
intimidation, a type of true threat. 
Finally, the Court's distaste for the prima facie provision also 
suggests its preference for a specific intent standard that requires 
the showing of an intent to threaten for true threats. Although the 
prima facie clause was discussed in light of the Court's definition of 
intimidation, which clearly requires the intent to threaten, the lan-
guage and tone of the opinion suggests a more expansive vision of 
Justice Marshall's subjective test. The plurality explains that its 
problem with the prima facie provision is that it fails to distinguish 
constitutionally protected speech from unprotected speech.154 Ac-
cordingly, "the provision chills constitutionally protected political 
speech because of the possibility that the Commonwealth will 
prosecute-and potentially convict-somebody engaging only in 
lawful political speech at the core of what the First Amendment is 
designed to protect. ... The First Amendment does not permit 
such a shortcut."155 Even though such statements were made in the 
context of intimidation, the language certainly suggests a more ex-
pansive interpretation-one that requires that the specific intent to 
threaten be an element for all true threats, not just intimidation. 
Such inferences have convinced one commentator that "Black now 
153 The author is not aware of any such example of harassing speech being pro-
scribed as a true threat; it is merely a hypothetical example. 
154 Black, 538 U.S. at 366 ("The prima facie provision makes no effort to distin-
guish ... between a cross burning done with the purpose of creating anger or resent-
ment and a cross burning done with the purpose of threatening or intimidating a vic-
tim. It does not distinguish between a cross burning at a public rally or a cross burning 
on a neighbor's lawn.") (emphasis added). Here, the Court is clearly contrasting the 
case of Barry Black with that of Elliott and O'Mara. 
155 Id. at 365, 367. 
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confirms that proof of specific intent (aim) must be proved also in 
threat cases." 156 
The third possible interpretation of the true threats language in 
Black is basically no interpretation at all. This understanding sug-
gests that the Black opinion has little application outside the con-
text of cross-burning, intimidation, and content discrimination. The 
Court's opinion takes up six United States Reports pages discuss-
ing the history of cross burning,157 four pages analyzing the statute 
in light of R.A. V. and its statements on content discrimination,158 
five pages scrutinizing the constitutionality of the prima facie pro-
vision,159 and a single paragraph examining the meaning of true 
threats. 1w Because the decision did not require an in-depth analysis 
of true threats or a more thorough discussion of the doctrine's 
scope and content, the Court may not have been attempting to 
provide a complete definition of true threats, including what, if 
any, intent standard is constitutionally required. In order to decide 
the constitutionality of the statute, the Court needed only to decide 
the meaning of intimidation and whether the statute's selection of 
cross burning constituted impermissible content discrimination. In 
fact, any discussion of an intent standard for true threats could 
technically be classified as dictum. Thus, proponents of this inter-
pretation believe that the Court was not trying to or did not defini-
tively decide the issue of intent for true threats. As one observer, 
who would likely endorse this understanding, explained: "although 
the Supreme Court's decision in Virginia v. Black represents an 
expansion and enrichment in First Amendment analysis, this case 
should, and likely will, be restricted to its facts." 161 Given the preva-
lence of the objective intent standard before Black, this interpreta-
tion would not affect its pervasiveness. 
Provided with a third opportunity to define the meaning of true 
threats and to establish a constitutionally required intent standard, 
the Court did not punt. However, this time it threw an incomplete 
156 Hartley, supra note 10, at 33. 
157 Black, 538 U.S. at 352-57. 
158 Id. at 360-63. 
159 Id. at 363-67. 
160 Id. at 359-60. 
161 Eric John Nies, Note, The Fiery Cross: Virginia v. Black, History, and the First 
Amendment, 50 S.D. L. Rev. 182, 217 (2005). 
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pass, failing to advance the issue beyond the original line of scrim-
mage. 
IV. So THE COURT SPOKE, BUT WHAT DID THE LOWER COURTS 
HEAR? 
As discussed above, the lower courts charged with the task of in-
terpreting Black had three viable options when it came to the con-
stitutional intent standard for true threats. Each approach has 
found its adherents. 
A. The Objective Test Interpretations 
Following Black, the vast majority of courts continued to use 
one of the objective intent standards that saturated the pre-Black 
landscape. For some, the language in Black expressly sanctioned 
their traditional objective test approach. In United States v. Ellis, 
the defendant, who was charged with making a threat against the 
President, requested that the court interpret Black as establishing a 
subjective intent standard for true threats.162 The court rejected the 
motion and held that the definition in Black was not inconsistent 
with the reasonable speaker test adopted by the Third Circuit a 
decade earlier in United States v. Kosma: 
While Black does appear to provide a definition of a "true 
threat," we do not agree with Defendant's interpretation of that 
definition .... The language [of the definition in Black] merely 
restates the Third Circuit's requirement that the speaker must 
have some intent to communicate the statement, meaning that 
the statement may not be a product of accident, coercion or du-
ress.163 
162 No. CR. 02-687-1, 2003 WL 22271671, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2003). The defen-
dant claimed that "his actual intent was not to threaten, rather it was to communicate 
the symptoms of his mental illness for the purposes of getting treatment." Id. 
163 Id. at *4; see also United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991). The 
court in Ellis also made the following observations: 
In addition, the Black court specifically recognized that the speaker need not 
actually intend to carry out the threat. ... As the Supreme Court pointed out, 
intimidating speech is only one type of "true threat." Obviously, the concerns 
when dealing with a statute that prohibits threats against the President of the 
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According to this court, Black was consistent with the reasonable 
speaker standard. 
In Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board,164 another court 
reached a similar conclusion. One of the issues was whether a stu-
dent's drawing constituted a true threat or was protected speech. 
After holding that speech is unprotected as a true threat "if an ob-
jectively reasonable person would interpret the speech as a serious 
expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm," the 
court asserted that the speech must first be "knowingly communi-
cated to either the object of the threat or a third person."165 Thus, 
the court understood the language in Black to stand solely for the 
proposition that the speaker must have knowingly made the state-
ment. After finding that the student did not knowingly communi-
cate the drawing, the court held the speech to be protected by the 
First Amendment.166 
This interpretation of Black has not been limited to federal 
courts. In Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller, the Supreme Court of 
Arizona, in deciding whether a letter to the editor of a newspaper 
constituted a true threat, observed that an Arizona appellate court 
"has adopted a substantially similar test for determining a 'true 
threat' under the First Amendment" as the standard adopted in 
Black. 167 That approach was the reasonable speaker test. The court 
found that the letter was protected speech because it did "not be-
lieve that a reasonable person could view that letter as 'a serious 
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a 
particular individual or group of individuals."'168 The court simply 
United States are quite different than the concerns when dealing with a cross 
burning statute. 
Ellis, 2003 WL 22271671, at *4 (internal quotations omitted). 
164 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004). 
165 ld. at 616 (citing, inter alia, Black, 538 U.S. at 359) (emphasis and internal quota-
tions omitted). 
166 Id. at 618. 
167 Citizen Publ'g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 114 (Ariz. 2005) (holding that "'true 
threats' are those statements made 'in a context or under such circumstances wherein 
a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those 
to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an inten-
tion to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of [a person]'") (alteration in origi-
na~ (quoting In re Kyle M., 27 P.3d 804, 808 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)). 
1 Miller, 115 P.3d at 115 (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359); see also Austad v. S.D. 
Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, No. 23914, 2006 WL 2036166, at *5 (S.D. July 19, 2006) 
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substituted the phrase "a reasonable person could view" in place of 
Black's "means to communicate" and applied an objective intent 
standard. 
Finally, the court in United States v. Bly recently opined that the 
language in Black not only supported an objective test but also ex-
plicitly rejected any specific intent requirement.169 The court held 
that the Fourth Circuit's reasonable listener test was still the guid-
ing precedent for determining whether speech constituted a true 
threat.110 Responding to the defendant's motion that the definition 
in Black required a showing of specific intent, the court posited 
that such an interpretation was clearly incorrect. The court held 
that the government was not required "to allege an intent to in-
timidate or injure," adding, "Black could not be clearer on this 
point."171 Notably, the court cites the Black opinion's rejection of 
one subjective intent standard, the intent to carry out the threat, as 
a signal that the Court rejected both specific intent tests-the in-
tent to carry out the threat and the intent to threaten. 172 
In addition to these courts, which held that the Black definition 
affirmatively supported an objective intent standard, some courts 
have continued to apply the objective test by ignoring or minimiz-
ing the application of Black in their true threats analyses. Amaz-
ingly, the Black opinion is frequently left out of the true threats 
discussion. For instance, in United States v. Fuller, the Seventh Cir-
cuit extolled the virtues of an objective test for true threats in a 
case involving threats made against the President.173 Although the 
court discussed Watts, it failed to even mention or cite the more re-
(quoting Black and applying the reasonable recipient objective test based on pre-
Black Eighth Circuit precedent). 
169 No. CRIM. 3:04CR00011, 2005 WL 2621996, at *2 (W.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2005); see 
suwa notes 4--7, 9 and accompanying text. 
0 Bly, 2005 WL 2621996, at *l. 
171 Id. at *2. 
172 Id. Another court has made the same assumption. In Sheehan v. Gregoire, the 
court held that "a true threat does not turn on the subjective intent of the speaker." 
272 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1141 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (citing Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60; 
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activ-
ists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2002) ("It is not necessary that the defendant in-
tend to, or be able to carry out his threat, the only intent requirement for a true threat 
is that the defendant intentionally or knowingly communicate the threat.")) ( empha-
sis added). 
173 387 F.3d 643, 646-48 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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cent Black opinion; it simply adopted the reasonable person stan-
dard, based on Roy, and upheld the conviction.114 Opinions by the 
First,175 Fourth,116 and Eleventh177 Circuits have all discussed the 
meaning of true threats without a single citation to Black. The 
same has occurred at the district court level as well. 178 Perhaps it is 
because these courts cannot confidently assert the meaning of the 
language in Black that they have instead relied on their respective 
jurisdiction's entrenched objective intent standard for guidance. 
Maybe these courts believe that Black only applies to cross burning 
or content discrimination and is not relevant in the context of 
threats against the President or other threatening speech. Perhaps 
they think the Black decision merely affirmed the use of an objec-
tive test and thus discussion or citation of it is unnecessary. What-
ever the reason, a surprising number of courts have paid little, if 
any, attention to Black when discussing the meaning of true 
threats. 
B. The Subjective Test Interpretation 
In upholding its continued use of an objective intent standard, 
the aforementioned Ellis court asserted that there was "nothing in 
the Black opinion to indicate that the Supreme Court intended to 
overrule a majority of the circuits by adopting a subjective test 
when dealing with 'true threats."'119 Put another way, absent a 
clearer statement from the Court, the circuit courts will not change 
the firmly established precedent of their true threat jurisprudence, 
11
• Id. at 646-48. 
175 See generally United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 15-17 (1st Cir. 2003) (ap-
plying the reasonable speaker objective test). 
176 See generally United States v. Lockhart, 382 F.3d 447, 451-52 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(comparing the Watts factors to the present circumstances in a prosecution for making 
threats against the President). 
m See generally United States v. Alaboud, 347 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(agplying the reasonable neutral test). 
7 See generally, e.g., United States v. Richards, 415 F. Supp. 2d 547 (E.D. Pa. 2005); 
United States v. Veliz, No. 03 CR. 1473, 2004 WL 964005 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2004); 
United States v. Oakley, No. CR. 02-123-01, 2003 WL 22425035 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 
2003). interestingly, Judge Surrick from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania wrote 
the opinion in both Oakley and Richards. He also authored the aforementioned Ellis 
decision. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text. 
11
• United States v. Ellis, No. CR. 02-687-1, 2003 WL 22271671, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 
15, 2003). 
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namely the use of an objective intent standard. However, the 
Tenth Circuit did find that the Court clearly adopted a subjective 
intent standard in Black and changed its own approach accord-
ingly. In United States v. Magleby, a decision that was briefly dis-
cussed at the outset of this Note, the court adopted Justice Mar-
shall's specific intent test for true threats. The court stated that true 
threats, "[u]nprotected by the Constitution[,] ... must be made 
'with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or 
death.' An intent to threaten is enough; the further intent to carry 
out the threat is unnecessary."180 While the Bly court quoted from 
the language of Black that said the intent to carry out the threat 
was unnecessary, the Magleby court quoted from the intimidation 
definition that required the specific intent to place the victim in 
fear. Both courts extrapolated their respective definition of true 
threats from these different parts of the Black definition.181 
C. The Ninth Circuit: A Locus for (and Microcosm of) Controversy 
By this point, it seems cliche to use the Ninth Circuit as the pre-
mier example of the judicial split over the proper intent standard 
for true threats. Remember, it was the Ninth Circuit that produced 
both Roy (the foundational opinion for the reasonable speaker 
test)182 and Twine (the lone pre-Black opinion to adopt Justice 
Marshall's specific intent to threaten standard);183 the Ninth Circuit 
was also home to the sharply contested Planned Parenthood deci-
sion, which produced majority and dissenting opinions with starkly 
different approaches to the intent question.184 Nevertheless, the 
Ninth Circuit's response to Black epitomizes the ambiguity of the 
180 United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting and citing 
Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60) (internal citations omitted); see also supra notes 8-9 and 
accompanying text. 
181 See id. at 1139; United States v. Bly, No. CRIM. 3:04CR00011, 2005 WL 2621996, 
at *2 (W.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2005); see also Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60. 
182 Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969); see supra notes 53-56, 81-88 
and accompanying text. 
183 United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 44-46, 73-77 
and accompanying text. 
184 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002); see supra notes 106-20 and accompanying 
text. 
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Court's attempted definition and demonstrates how this lack of 
clarity continues to trouble the jurisprudence. 
In United States v. Lincoln, the Ninth Circuit applied its deeply-
rooted reasonable speaker test in a prosecution for a threat made 
against the President. 185 Like some of the courts mentioned above, 
the court in Lincoln did not refer to the Black decision when dis-
cussing the meaning of "true threats. "186 Instead, it applied an ob-
jective intent standard and held that the letter in question did not 
constitute a true threat. 187 Interestingly, the author of the Lincoln 
opinion was Judge Rawlinson. She was the only judge on the panel 
who participated in the Planned Parenthood en bane decision. In 
that case, she joined the majority opinion, which adopted an objec-
tive intent approach.188 
The Ninth Circuit panel that decided United States v. Cassel also 
had a single alumnus from the Planned Parenthood decision, Judge 
O'Scannlain.189 Unlike Judge Rawlinson, Judge O'Scannlain dis-
sented in Planned Parenthood. 190 Filed less than two months after 
Lincoln, the Cassel opinion, written by Judge O'Scannlain, adopted 
an entirely new approach to the meaning of true threats. After ac-
knowledging that true threats are unprotected by the First 
Amendment, the court made the following observations: 
We are ... faced with the question whether intent to threaten the 
victim is required in order for speech to fall within the First 
Amendment exception for threats .... [T]he disputed question is 
whether the government must prove that the defendant intended 
his words or conduct to be understood by the victim as a threat. 
[Defendant] argues that it must. The government's position is 
that mere negligence with regard to the victim's understanding is 
enough: in other words, speech is punishable if a reasonable per-
son would understand it as a threat, whether or not the speaker 
meant for it to be so understood.191 
185 403 F.3d 703, 706 (9th Cir. 2005) (relying on United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 
1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
186 The court did mention Watts, however. Id. at 706--07. 
187 Id. at 706--08. 
188 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1062. 
189 United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 624 (9th Cir. 2005). 
190 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1089, 1101. 
191 Cassel, 408 F.3d at 627-28. 
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Thus, the court signaled its intention to address the constitutional 
issue which has consumed this Note-a question the Ninth Circuit 
evaded when it first decided the issue in Roy. 1<n 
Although it recognized that, with the exception of Twine and its 
progeny, the Ninth Circuit had traditionally applied the reasonable 
speaker test, the Cassel panel asserted that Black was now the 
guiding precedent. After quoting Black's definition of true threats 
and intimidation, the panel interpreted the Court's language to 
mean that "only intentional threats are criminally punishable con-
sistently with the First Amendment. ... A natural reading of [the 
Court's] language embraces not only the requirement that the 
communication itself be intentional, but also the requirement that 
the speaker intend for his language to threaten the victim."193 Not-
ing that the "Court laid great weight on the intent requirement" in 
Black, the Cassel panel held that it must "conclude that the same 
principle governs in the case before us. "194 Recognizing that the 
adoption of a specific intent to threaten subjective test conflicted 
with some of the circuit's previous decisions, the court simply ob-
served that the Supreme Court's "definition of a constitutionally 
proscribable threat is, of course, binding," and therefore the court 
was "bound to conclude that speech may be deemed unprotected 
by the First Amendment as a 'true threat' only upon proof that the 
speaker subjectively intended the speech as a threat."195 
In a span of forty-five days (the length of time between the Lin-
coln and Cassel decisions), the Ninth Circuit had seemingly made a 
192 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
193 Cassel, 408 F.3d at 631 ("The Court's insistence on intent to threaten as the sine 
qua non of a constitutionally punishable threat is especially clear from its ultimate 
holding that the Virginia statute was unconstitutional precisely because the element 
of intent was effectively eliminated by the statute's provision rendering any burning 
of a cross on the property of another prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate.") 
(internal quotations omitted). 
194 Id. at 631-33. 
195 Id. at 633. The court attempted to reconcile its holding with the Lincoln decision, 
which was decided only weeks earlier, in a footnote: "Because Lincoln merely applied 
longstanding precedent and did not raise or consider the implications of Virginia v. 
Black, it does not constrain our analysis in this case." Id. at 633 n.9. Similarly, the 
court reconciled its opinion with some of those discussed earlier, which held that 
Black affirmed the use of an objective test, by stating that "it appears that no other 
circuit has squarely addressed the question whether Black requires the government to 
prove the defendant's intent." Id. at 633 n.10 (emphasis added). 
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180-degree turn on the issue of intent. Forty-two days later, the 
Ninth Circuit made another about-face. In United States v. Romo, a 
case involving a conviction for threats made against the President, 
the court revisited the meaning of true threats.196 Instead of apply-
ing the specific intent standard seemingly required by Cassel, the 
court applied its familiar reasonable speaker objective test and ex-
plained the limited reach of Cassel in a footnote: 
The recent decision in United States v. Cassel does not change 
our view. Cassel leaves untouched the reasonable person analysis 
for presidential threats because it did not address whether stat-
utes like 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) require intent. Because [the defen-
dant] has not raised First Amendment issues and Cassel does not 
alter the analysis of presidential threats, we employ the decades-
old [Roy] approach to analyzing threats under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 87l(a).191 
But the Ninth Circuit did not rest with its decision in Romo. In 
United States v. Stewart, a case heard by the same panel which de-
cided Cassel, the court attempted to reconcile the circuit's most re-
cent true threat opinions.198 The defendant was convicted for mak-
ing a threat against a federal judge, and one of the issues before the 
court was whether his speech was constitutionally protected.199 The 
court compared the contradictory holdings in Cassel and Romo 
and, as would be expected given the panel's membership, had 
doubts about "Roma's continued use of the objective 'true threat' 
definition" in light of "Black's subjective 'true threat' definition."200 
Instead of resolving the conflicting approaches, the court took a 
page from the Supreme Court's playbook and punted: "Nonethe-
less, we need not decide whether the objective or subjective 'true 
threat' definition should apply here. That is because the evidence 
establishes that [the defendant's] statement was a 'true threat' un-
der either definition and thus is not protected by the First 
196 413 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2005). This panel had no members from the en bane 
Planned Parenthood decision. 
197 Id. at 1051 n.6 (internal citations omitted). 
198 420 F.3d 1007, 1016-19 (9th Cir. 2005). 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 1018. 
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Amendment."201 Put simply, the court threw up its hands and de-
clared, at least temporarily, an intra-circuit truce. 
V. WHAT SHOULD THE INTENT STANDARD BE?: 
A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 
As evidenced by the back-and-forth of the Ninth Circuit, there is 
still a need, even after Black, for a clear and consistent approach to 
the intent standard of true threats. While the best interpretation of 
Black seems to be that the specific intent to threaten is required for 
all true threats, not just intimidation, the Court's inability to clearly 
articulate an intent standard has allowed a potpourri of mens rea 
approaches to persist in the lower courts.202 Regardless of what the 
Court's aims in Black truly were, the disparate treatments (and in-
terpretations) by the lower courts indicate that the Court must re-
visit the meaning of true threats, and the question of intent, some-
time soon. When that time arrives, what intent standard should the 
Court adopt? This Part will examine the normative arguments of 
each approach and argue that for all true threats the Court should 
require the same subjective intent standard it adopted for intimida-
tion-the specific intent to threaten the recipient or victim. 
True threats, like any of the "Chaplinsky exceptions" to the First 
Amendment, should be defined with both the values underlying 
free speech and the reasons for proscribing the category in mind. 
This much is not controversial. As the Court noted in Black, "[t]he 
hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow 'free trade in 
ideas'-even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might 
find distasteful or discomforting." 203 These principles must be bal-
201 Id. 
202 Some commentators have been even more critical of the Court's failure to clearly 
define the meaning of true threats. For example, in a sharp critique, Professor Gey 
states that "we have no way of knowing exactly what Black portends for free speech 
because (to put the matter unkindly) Justice O'Connor's opinion in the cross burning 
case borders on the incoherent. The Court sends several different messages about free 
speech in Black, many of which contradict each other." Gey, A Few Questions, supra 
note 3, at 1287-88; see also Martin, supra note 10, at 290-91 ("Unfortunately, the 
Court [in Black] did not delineate the border between true threats and protected 
speech ... [and thus] avoided the precarious task of defining the outer reaches of the 
true threats doctrine."). 
203 Black, 538 U.S. at 358; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If 
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the govern-
ment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea 
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anced against the motives for prohibiting threatening speech: "pro-
tecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption 
that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened 
violence will occur. "204 It was an attempt to achieve such a balance 
that originally animated the conception of the term "true 
threats."205 For reasons that will be elaborated further, the subjec-
tive test that requires the specific intent to threaten achieves the 
optimal balance. 
Since the Ninth Circuit's 1969 decision in Roy, the objective in-
tent test has been the prevailing standard.206 In United States v. 
Kosma, the Third Circuit provided a particularly thorough, and 
fairly representative, justification for the objective intent approach 
to true threats. "[M]indful of the potential difficulties in distin-
guishing between constitutionally protected political speech and 
unprotected threats,"207 the court offered two generally accepted 
reasons for why the objective intent approach is superior. First, the 
objective intent test "best satisfies the purposes" of punishing 
threatening speech "since it recognizes the power of a threat to 
hinder ... even when the threatmaker has no intention of carrying 
itself offensive or disagreeable."); see generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964) (extolling the importance of protecting speech even if it contains factual 
errors or defamatory content because of the need for promoting vigorous and open 
debate in public discourse). 
204 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992); see also Black, 538 U.S. at 
360; supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
205 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (noting that "we must inter-
pret the language Congress chose against the background of a profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials" and that political lan-
guage "is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact") (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
206 See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text. 
207 United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 553 (3d Cir. 1991). While Kosma deals with 
a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 871 for threats made against the President, and thus 
its rationales are tailored to such a prosecution, its reasoning for the superiority of an 
objective intent approach is consistent with the justifications courts and commenta-
tors give for objective intent tests generally, regardless of who the victim or recipient 
of the alleged threat is. Furthermore, as noted earlier, with the exception of the Ninth 
Circuit, every circuit that has adopted an objective intent approach has applied that 
standard across-the-board to all contexts of threatening statements. See supra note 75. 
Because this author agrees that the same intent standard should be used for all true 
threats, the respective merits of the objective and subjective intent approaches will be 
analyzed regardless of whether the victim is the President or a private person. 
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out the threat and there is no actual danger."208 Because "[t]he 
threat alone is disruptive of the recipient's sense of personal safety 
and well-being," the court argued that one subjective intent stan-
dard, the specific intent to carry out the threat test, was inappro-
priate. 209 
Having dismissed the requirement of a specific intent to carry 
out the threat, the court in Kosma addressed the second subjective 
standard, the specific intent to threaten test, and supplied another 
popular reason for preferring an objective intent approach. The 
court considered and rejected the specific intent to threaten stan-
dard, first articulated by Justice Marshall in Rogers, because this 
"subjective test makes it considerably more difficult for the gov-
ernment to prosecute threats."210 Moreover, "any subjective test 
potentially frustrates the purposes" of preventing true threats be-
cause it "make[ s] prosecution of these threats significantly more 
difficult."211 Thus, according to Kosma and other objective intent 
opinions, the specific intent to threaten should not be required. 
Supporters of an objective intent standard correctly reject the 
subjective test which requires the defendant to have intended to 
carry out the threat. As noted in Kosma, such a standard ignores 
the harms associated with threatening speech, such as fear and dis-
ruption. The speaker need not intend to carry out his threat in or-
der for his words to have a deleterious effect. Put simply, threats 
are not, and should not, be considered inchoate crimes. Thus, most 
courts, including the Supreme Court, have rightly held that "[t]he 
speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat" in order 
for the communication to constitute a true threat.212 
When it comes to the specific intent to threaten subjective test, 
however, the majority of courts have missed the mark. Although 
208 Kosma, 951 F.2d. at 557. 
20
' Id. (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original); see also United States v. 
Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that the objective standard best ac-
complishes the aim of preserving the recipient's sense of personal safety). 
21
° Kosma, 951 F.2d at 556-58 (citing Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 48 (1975) 
(Marshall, J., concurring)). 
211 Id. at 558. As one commentator stated, concurring with this justification for re-
jecting the specific intent to threaten, "a subjective speaker-based test could over-
burden prosecutors by requiring an extremely high standard of proof." Strauss, supra 
note 10, at 263-64. 
212 Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60. 
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an objective test secures the purposes of regulating threats, it does 
not properly balance those concerns with the values of the First 
Amendment. In fact, the foundational opinion for the reasonable 
speaker test, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Roy, did not even con-
sider the First Amendment implications of its interpretation.213 Be-
cause it undervalues the tenet that language which is "vituperative, 
abusive, and inexact" may still be protected under the First 
Amendment,214 the objective intent standard, in each of its forms, is 
over-inclusive when it comes to prohibiting threatening speech. By 
focusing on how a reasonable person may react, the objective ap-
proach severely discounts the speaker's general First Amendment 
right to communicate freely, even if that means using language 
which a reasonable person might find disagreeable. The Court 
clearly stated this principle in Black when it opined, "[t]he hall-
mark of the protection of free speech is to allow 'free trade in 
ideas'-even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might 
find distasteful or discomforting."215 By ignoring the intent of the 
speaker, an objective test runs the risk of punishing crudely worded 
ideas; conversely, a subjective test provides a better line of demar-
cation between ideas and threats. If the speaker did not intend for 
his communication to be threatening, it is much more likely that he 
intended to communicate an idea, even if he did so using what a 
reasonable person would consider abrasive or offensive language. 
As Justice Marshall explained in his concurrence in Rogers, "[i]n 
essence, the objective interpretation embodies a negligence stan-
dard, charging the defendant with responsibility for the effect of his 
statements on his listeners ..... [W]e should be particularly wary of 
adopting such a standard for a statute that regulates pure speech" 
because it "would have substantial costs in discouraging the unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open debate that the First Amendment is 
intended to protect."216 Because an objective test makes the intent 
of the speaker irrelevant, a speaker who does not intend for his 
communication to be threatening, but fears that some may inter-
pret it as so, will not engage in such expression. Consequently, 
213 See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text. 
21
• Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). 
215 Black, 538 U.S. at 358. 
216 Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 47-48 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (in-
ternal citations and quotations omitted). 
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speakers who do not intend for their speech to be threatening will 
still censor themselves, fearful that a reasonable person may con-
strue the communication as threatening. Put simply, an objective 
standard chills speech. 
Like an objective intent standard, Justice Marshall's subjective 
test protects against the harms caused by threatening speech. 
Unlike the objective intent approach, however, it properly bal-
ances this goal against the values of free expression. Instead of 
simply prohibiting speech based on the reaction it incurs, this sub-
jective intent standard punishes the speaker who intends to create 
the harms of threatening speech, be it fear, disruption, or the threat 
of violence. Under the First Amendment, this is a much better ap-
proach. By requiring a specific intent to threaten, a speaker who 
wishes to bring about the harms associated with threatening speech 
will be punished; at the same time, the speaker who had no such in-
tention will be given the necessary "breathing space" to speak 
freely and openly. 
There are two common and related criticisms to this subjective 
intent approach. First, objective intent proponents, such as the 
court in Kosma, claim that a subjective intent test will increase the 
prosecutor's burden. This, however, is not a legitimate reason for 
rejecting a subjective standard. If anything, the burden on the 
prosecutor should be heightened when the regulation of pure 
speech is involved. Furthermore, the purpose of criminalizing any 
form of conduct, including speech, is not to ease the prosecutor's 
burden but to prohibit conduct society finds worthy of punishment. 
Second, critics of the specific intent to threaten standard have 
argued that such an approach should not be adopted because it 
"would allow carefully crafted statements by speakers who actually 
intend to threaten to go unpunished. "217 Even if this were true, such 
criticism does not merit the rejection of this subjective intent test. 
In the vast majority of cases, if a statement seems clearly threaten-
ing, it will be difficult for the defendant to plausibly explain how 
his communication was not intended to be threatening. For in-
stance, in United States v. Bly, the defendant sent several threaten-
ing letters and emails to University of Virginia employees follow-
211 Strauss, supra note 10, at 263. 
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ing his termination from a graduate program. One such communi-
cation said the following: 
It would be a damn shame if the only way I could obtain justice 
in this element of class warfare is to kill Dr. Rydin. This is not 
venting. I promise you, this is DEADLY SERIOUS. Please get 
your ass in gear so I am not left with retribution, retaliation, and 
vigilante justice as the only justice available to me. NO 
JOKE .... Remember my belief in bullets as the ultimate backup 
for futile dialogue.218 
In cases such as this, any attempt by the defendant to explain the 
intent of his communication as non-threatening would most likely 
be laughable and unbelievable. Only in cases at the proverbial 
margin, where the line between protected idea and punishable 
threat is more thinly sliced, will the application of the specific in-
tent to threaten standard potentially lead to a different outcome 
than if an objective test were applied. 
For example, in United States v. Rogers, the case in which Justice 
Marshall introduced the specific intent to threaten standard in a 
concurring opinion (the Court reversed the conviction on other 
grounds), the defendant was prosecuted for making threats against 
President Nixon. After walking into a coffee shop, the defendant 
"accosted several customers and waitresses, telling them, among 
other things, that he was Jesus Christ and that he was opposed to 
President Nixon's visiting China because the Chinese had a bomb 
that only he knew about, which might be used against the people of 
this country."219 During these outbursts, the defendant "announced 
that he was going to go to Washington to 'whip Nixon's ass,' or to 
'kill him in order to save the United States."'220 After local police 
were notified of the disturbance and threatening remarks, the de-
fendant was questioned about his behavior. Asked if he had threat-
ened the President, the defendant "replied that he didn't like the 
idea of the President's going to China and making friends with the 
Chinese." He then said, "'I'm going to Washington and I'm going 
218 United States v. Bly, No. CRIM. 3:04CR00011, 2005 WL 2621996, at *l n.1 (W.D. 
Va. Oct. 14, 2005) (alteration in original). 
219 Rogers, 422 U.S. at 41-42 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
220 Id. at 42. 
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to beat his ass off. Better yet, I will go kill him.'"221 Rogers was 
prosecuted for making threatening statements against the Presi-
dent and was later convicted after a jury trial; the circuit court af-
firmed the conviction. At his trial, the judge instructed the jury that 
it should convict if the reasonable speaker objective test was met.222 
It is hard to know whether Rogers would still have been con-
victed if the specific intent to threaten subjective test was used in-
stead of the reasonable speaker standard. However, it seems at 
least plausible that given the context of his threatening statements 
(his disapproval of President Nixon's visit to China), his remarks 
were nothing more than crude political statements of the sort that 
were protected in Watts. However, it is also possible that he actu-
ally intended to threaten the President. The point is that an objec-
tive intent test fails to distinguish between these two situations, 
rendering the speaker's actual intent immaterial. All that matters 
under an objective standard is whether a reasonable person would 
have construed the statement as threatening. Conversely, the spe-
cific intent to threaten standard inquires into the speaker's motive, 
distinguishing between these two possible explanations of the 
speaker's intent. 
It must be emphasized that the use of a subjective intent test 
does not mean the defendant will automatically go free; instead, it 
will simply permit the speaker an opportunity to explain his state-
ment-an explanation that may shed light on the question of 
whether this communication was articulating an idea or expressing 
a threat.223 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 43-44 ("[T]he jury was permitted to convict on a showing merely that a rea-
sonable man in petitioner's place would have foreseen that the statements he made 
would be understood as indicating a serious intention to commit the act."). 
223 Another way the use of a subjective intent standard could potentially lead to a 
different result than an objective intent test is that defenses based on mental incompe-
tence (or voluntary intoxication) would be permissible. For instance, in United States 
v. Richards, 415 F. Supp. 2d. 547, 551 (E.D. Pa. 2005), a defendant with "evident" 
mental health problems was prosecuted for making threatening statements against an 
immediate family member of a former President (former First Lady and current Sena-
tor Hillary Clinton). In line for dinner at a homeless shelter, the defendant said, ap-
parently to no one in particular but loud enough for most in the room to hear, "I'm 
gonna [sic] put two bullets in her, gonna [sic] put two bullets into Hillary Clinton." Id. 
at 549. The defendant was later involuntarily committed to a mental health clinic. 
However, as the court implicitly recognized, a defense based on mental defect would 
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Any time the government must prove a specific intent element, 
society runs the risk of its craftiest criminals escaping conviction. 
This risk does not mean, however, that we should limit our mens 
rea options to general intent (negligence and recklessness, for ex-
ample). Instead, the legal system, as it always does, must rely on 
the jury (or judge in a bench trial) to make judgments as to 
whether the defendant is telling the truth about his intent. By re-
quiring a subjective intent, the government can still secure a con-
viction for blatant threats. The only significant difference is that 
under a subjective test, the defendant can legitimately argue that 
he did not mean to threaten the recipient; under an objective test, 
he is limited to arguing how a reasonable person should have un-
derstood his communication. When pure speech is punished, the 
speaker's intent should matter.224 Moreover, the results in the easy 
cases would not change. As even the court in Kosma admitted, the 
adoption of a "subjective 'knowingly' standard would probably not 
open the floodgates to threats" going unpunished.225 The only area 
that would likely see a difference is at the edge. In those close-call 
situations, however, it is much better to let the "crafty criminal" go 
free than to imprison the innocent speaker whose words uninten-
tionally seemed threatening to a "reasonable person." Otherwise, 
speech, especially at the fringe, will be unnecessarily chilled.226 
only be permissible under a subjective intent test. Id. at 551; see also supra notes 44-
47 and accompanying text. 
"'The First Amendment's incitement exception provides an apt analogy. In that 
context, the Court has held that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free 
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of 
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added). Brandenburg was decided less than 
two months after Watts. 
225 United States v. Kosma, 951F.2d549, 558 (3d Cir. 1991). 
226 The Court has taken a similar approach when it comes to the First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine. Fearful that overbroad statutes would inappropriately chill 
speech, the Court has allowed defendants, whose conduct is not necessarily constitu-
tionally protected, to make facial challenges to statutes which may chill the speech of 
others, even if not their own. In effect, the Court has let the "uncrafty criminal" go 
free in order to secure sufficient free speech protection for others whose speech may 
be chilled as a result of an otherwise permissible prosecution. For a discussion of the 
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and 
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System 184-99 (5th ed. 2003). 
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Instead of letting the reasonable person decide what constitutes 
a true threat, only those speakers who intended for their communi-
cation to be threatening should be punished for their speech. As 
the Court famously explained, "we cannot indulge the facile as-
sumption that one can forbid particular words without also running 
a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process."221 A speaker 
should not become a criminal simply because of the effect of his 
words; only when the speaker has the specific intent to threaten 
should he be punished for making a true threat. 
CONCLUSION 
For now, the Black opinion has had a limited influence on the 
jurisprudence of true threats and the issue of intent. After quoting 
the definition provided in Black, the district court in United States 
v. Carmichael explained that "[t]he Supreme Court has not settled 
on a definition of a 'true threat."'228 If anything, the Black decision 
further muddied the area by suggesting, at least to some, that the 
specific intent to threaten was constitutionally required-a re-
quirement that enjoyed little support in the jurisprudence before 
April 2003. 
At this point, only two things seem clear. First, absent a stronger 
statement from the Court in support of a subjective standard, the 
objective intent approach will continue to reign supreme. This, un-
fortunately, means speech will continue to be chilled in the name 
of precedent and prosecutorial burden. Second, given the range of 
reactions to Black, the Court will have to revisit the meaning of 
true threats and the issue of intent. When it does, we can only hope 
it is more successful at clearly defining the doctrine than it has 
been in the past. Until then, it will be fourth down and goal to go. 
221 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
228 United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (apply-
ing the reasonable neutral test for the meaning of true threats). 
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